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This Article explores global human rights obligations, which form the least elucidated and 
the most unfulfilled type of extraterritorial obligations. Global obligations represent a key legal 
tool for empowering the most vulnerable individuals and social groups, promoting social justice, 
and reducing extreme poverty and inequality worldwide. Despite their importance, global 
obligations have not yet received adequate legal recognition, regulation, and realization. The 
Article outlines the main contours of the conception of global obligations. While defending a 
human rights-based cosmopolitan concept of justice, it addresses issues surrounding the nature, 
status, content, scope, and hierarchy of moral duties towards non-compatriots and shows under 
which conditions and to what extent these duties should be recognized as human rights obligations 
of multiple actors. The Article aims to demonstrate that global obligations are morally justified 
human rights obligations that bind all members of the international community and require their 
legal regulation and implementation. It suggests a new classification of global obligations and 
stresses their significance for the enjoyment of guarantees of relational and distributive justice, as 
well as for promoting a shift from a state-centered to human-centered global order. It also seeks 
to uncover the interrelation between philosophical discourse, normative legal order, and legal 
practice. The Article explains how contemporary theories of global justice can contribute to the 
justification, conceptualization, allocation, and implementation of global obligations. It translates 
philosophical ideas into the language of law and incorporates empirical findings in relation to 
global obligations. At the same time, it examines whether human rights theory and practice 
regarding global obligations are capable of, and essential to, solving widely debated issues of global 
justice. 
                                                 
  Post-Doctoral Global Fellow and Scholar in Residence, Center for Human Rights and Global 
Justice, New York University School of Law. I would like to thank Joseph Raz, Mark Barenberg, 
Sarah Cleveland, David Bilchitz, David Miller, Thomas Pogge, Leora Dahan Katz, and Yuliya Mik 
for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I presented the Article in a special 
workshop, Human Rights Accountability of Non-State Actors, which I organized at the IVR World 
Congress in Lucerne (July 7–13, 2019) and in the Junior Scholar Workshop at the Faculty of Law 
of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Nov. 27, 2019). I am very grateful to all participants of 
these workshops for their helpful advice. Many thanks to the editors of the Chicago Journal of 
International Law for their important suggestions and support. 
What Global Human Rights Obligations Do We Have? Pribytkova 
Winter 2020 385 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 386 
II. Obligations towards Non-Compatriots ............................................................. 391 
A. Individual as the Ultimate Unit of Moral and Legal Concern .................... 392 
B. Why Cosmopolitanism? ................................................................................... 395 
C. What Cosmopolitanism? .................................................................................. 399 
D. Towards a Human Rights-Based Cosmopolitanism ................................... 402 
E. Summary ............................................................................................................ 407 
III. Extraterritorial Obligations Corresponding to Socio-Economic Rights ..... 407 
A. Diagonal Legal Relations: From State-Centered to Human-Centered  
Order........................................................................................................................ 407 
B. Multiple Duty-Bearers ...................................................................................... 412 
1. What is the Normative Framework of Global Actors’ Extraterritorial 
Obligations? ........................................................................................................ 413 
2. How are Extraterritorial Obligations of Various Actors Regulated?..... 417 
C. Two Types of Extraterritorial Obligations .................................................... 424 
D. Obligations to Respect, Protect, and Fulfill Socio-Economic Rights 
Universally ............................................................................................................... 428 
E. Summary ............................................................................................................ 431 
IV. Global Human Rights Obligations ................................................................... 431 
A. Common Prejudices about Global Obligations ........................................... 432 
B. Basic, Relational, and Distributive Equality .................................................. 436 
C. Global Obligations of Relational Justice ....................................................... 441 
D. Global Obligations of Distributive Justice ................................................... 445 
E. Summary ............................................................................................................ 448 
V. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 449 
 
  
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 386 Vol. 20 No. 2 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
I am in no way beneath thee in moral worth and . . . , as a person, I am equal to thee.1 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.2 
In the modern globalized world, actions of multiple global actors—states, 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)3 and non-state actors (NSAs)4—have a 
crucial impact on the enjoyment of human rights by individuals worldwide, 
especially by those in poverty. Examples of such actions include wars and military 
interventions, unfair trade and investment policies, inadequate international 
financial regulations and illicit financial flows, harmful exploitation of natural 
resources, environmental destruction, economic sanctions, and injurious 
development aid programs. Extraterritorial obligations5 are a key legal tool for 
holding global actors accountable for their human rights violations, promoting 
social justice, and reducing extreme poverty and inequality worldwide. Despite 
their importance, extraterritorial obligations have not yet received adequate legal 
recognition, regulation, and realization. Scholars and practitioners have noted 
major discrepancies between globalization and contemporary human rights law:6 
obligations corresponding to economic, social, and cultural rights (socio-
economic rights) are still often considered to be applicable only within states’ 
borders (if at all);7 obligations of IGOs and NSAs are frequently believed to be 
                                                 
1  FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, A WRITER’S DIARY 512 (2009). 
2  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 1 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter 
UDHR]. 
3  For example, U.N. agencies, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. 
4  For example, non-governmental organizations and foundations, transnational corporations, 
religious groups, paramilitary and armed resistance groups. 
5  Extraterritorial obligations are neither horizontal obligations of actors that are non-subordinate to 
one another (such as states and NSAs), nor vertical obligations between actors at different levels of 
hierarchy (such as state governments and their citizens). Rather, they are diagonal obligations of 
global actors towards individuals. On the usage of and interrelation between various terms for 
describing extraterritorial obligations, see Mark Gibney, On Terminology: Extraterritorial Obligations, in 
GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (Malcom Langford et al. eds., 2013). 
6  See, for example, Wouter Vandenhole, Emerging Normative Frameworks on Transnational Human Rights 
Obligations 1 (EUI Working Paper, Law 2012/17), http://perma.cc/RU5B-V8Z4; Nehal Bhuta, The 
Frontiers of Extraterritoriality—Human Rights Law as Global Law, in THE FRONTIERS OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND ITS CHALLENGES 1 (Nehal Bhuta ed., 2016); ARNE 
VANDENBOGAERDE, TOWARDS SHARED ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW: LAW, PROCEDURES AND PRINCIPLES 1–5 (2016). 
7  ETO Consortium, The Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 3 (2013). 
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exhausted by negative duties to respect human rights;8 and existing remedies for 
the violation of extraterritorial obligations in the area of socio-economic rights are 
very limited and difficult to access for individual claimants.9 A wide area of 
extraterritorial relations remains, therefore, an accountability-free zone. 
Global actors, as members of the international community, are responsible 
not only for the human rights violations they cause but also for the realization of 
socio-economic rights universally. The latter type of extraterritorial obligations is 
called “obligations of a global character” or “global obligations.”10 As the least 
elucidated and the most unfulfilled type of extraterritorial obligations, global 
obligations form the subject of this study. 
In comparison to extraterritorial obligations concerning civil and political 
rights, extraterritorial obligations relating to socio-economic rights are 
substantially less examined. Furthermore, neither researchers nor practitioners 
have comprehensively explored the nature, status, content, scope, right-holders, 
and duty-bearers of global obligations, which correspond to socio-economic 
rights, and the mechanisms necessary for their implementation. 
The history of the study of global obligations can be divided into three major 
periods. The first is a preparatory period characterized by fragmentary research 
on diverse aspects of global obligations, including global obligations presupposed 
by international human rights instruments,11 those corresponding to certain socio-
economic rights,12 and global commitments derived from the right to 
                                                 
8  See SIGRUN I. SKOGLY, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE WORLD BANK AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 151–52 (2001); John Ruggie, Interim Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises, ¶ 66, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006). 
9  See, for example, Ashfaq Khalfan, Division of Responsibility Amongst States, in GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE 
DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 299, 301 (Malcom Langford et al. eds., 2013); VANDENBOGAERDE, supra note 
6, at 89–140. 
10  See ETO Consortium, supra note 7, at 6 (principle 8 of the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial 
Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [hereinafter the 
Maastricht Principles]). 
11  See, for example, SIGRUN I. SKOGLY, BEYOND NATIONAL BORDERS: STATES’ HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (2006); Magdalena Sepúlveda, Obligations of 
‘International Assistance and Cooperation’ in an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 24 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 271 (2006); Wouter Vandenhole, Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in the CRC: Is There a Legal Obligation to Cooperate Internationally for Development?, 17 
INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 23 (2009); Michael Wabwile, Implementing the Social and Economic Rights of Children 
in Developing Countries: The Place of International Assistance and Cooperation, 18 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 355 
(2010); Fons Coomans, The Extraterritorial Scope of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in the Work of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 11 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
12  See, for example, Sigrun I. Skogly, Right to Adequate Food: National Implementation and Extraterritorial 
Obligations, 11 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 339 (2007); Judith Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Human 
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development and the Millennium Development Goals.13  
The second period is associated with the adoption of a milestone soft law 
document, the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in 
the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2011) (hereinafter the 
Maastricht Principles),14 and commentaries to it15 that provided an important 
systematic exposition of the general principles, definition, and types of states’ 
extraterritorial obligations. The Maastricht Principles have great merit because, 
unlike soft law principles governing extraterritorial obligations of other actors,16 
they recognize states’ “obligations of a global character.” At the same time, the 
Maastricht Principles are limited in several important respects: (1) they pay 
comparatively less attention to global obligations than to remedial extraterritorial 
obligations relating to states’ acts and omissions; (2) they focus exclusively on 
obligations of states, though they claim to be applicable to IGOs as well,17 and, 
therefore, obligations of other NSAs and individuals are beyond their scope; (3) 
they bolster a state-centered view of global obligations, including global 
obligations to assist in the realization of socio-economic rights; (4) they do not 
specify a normative basis, nature, or status of global obligations; and (5) while 
                                                 
Rights Responsibility of International Assistance and Cooperation in Health, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS 104 (Mark Gibney & Sigrun Skogly eds., 2010). 
13  See, for example, Philipp Dann, Accountability in Development Aid Law: The World Bank, UNDP and 
Emerging Structures of Transnational Oversight, 44 Archiv des Völkerrechts 381 (2006); MARGOT E. 
SALOMON, GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: WORLD POVERTY AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007) [hereinafter GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY]; CASTING 
THE NET WIDER: HUMAN RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT AND NEW DUTY-BEARERS (Margot E. Salomon 
et al. eds., 2007). 
14  The Maastricht Principles are a non-binding international expert opinion, in the creation of which 
40 prominent human rights scholars and practitioners took part in 2011. For a critique of the 
Maastricht Principles as a human rights instrument, see Ralph Wilde, Dilemmas in Promoting Global 
Economic Justice through Human Rights Law, in THE FRONTIERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND ITS CHALLENGES 127 (Nehal Bhuta ed., 2016). 
15  See, for example, Olivier De Schutter et al., Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial 
Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 1084 (2012); 
Margot E. Salomon & Ian Seiderman, Human Rights Norms for a Globalized World: The Maastricht 
Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 3 GLOB. 
POL’Y 458 (2012); Fons Coomans, Situating the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of 
States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Maastricht Faculty of Law, Working Paper, 
2013). 
16  See, for example, Tilburg Guiding Principles on the World Bank, IMF and Human Rights, in WORLD BANK, 
IMF AND HUMAN RIGHTS 247 (Willem van Genugten et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter Tilburg Guiding 
Principles]; U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 
U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011) [hereinafter U.N. Guiding Principles]; Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations Adopted at its Sixty-Third Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/66/10 (2011) [hereinafter Draft Articles on International Organizations]. 
17  ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principle 16 of the Maastricht Principles). 
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interpreting global obligations as obligations of conduct, rather than obligations 
of result, they leave many issues surrounding their content and scope unclear.  
The third period is represented by recent studies aimed at finding solutions 
to questions that the Maastricht Principles leave open (especially regarding the 
direct extraterritorial obligations of NSAs and IGOs), where global obligations 
are still given an insignificant place.18 Most contemporary studies concentrate on 
global obligations of conduct, that is, obligations to cooperate and assist,19 and in 
particular obligations to cooperate for sustainable development.20 Global 
obligations of result—interactional obligations to realize socio-economic rights 
universally and institutional obligations to create and maintain a just global 
order—often fall outside the scope of these studies.21 
This Article proposes ways to fill two major gaps in the field: the lack of a 
systematic legal conception, and the lack of a well-developed legal framework of 
various actors’ global obligations. Its primary purposes are therefore: first, to 
justify global obligations in the area of socio-economic rights as human rights 
obligations of multiple actors; and second, to analyze their nature, status, types, 
content, and scope. It aims to clarify several important issues on which, as of yet, 
there is no agreement in the literature or in practice, including: the normative basis 
of global obligations (whether they are based on human rights or other demands 
for justice); their status (whether they are moral or legal obligations); their nature 
                                                 
18  See, for example, GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Malcom Langford et al. eds., 2013); 
CHALLENGING TERRITORIALITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES FOR A 
MULTI DUTY-BEARER HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME (Wouter Vandenhole ed., 2015); WILLEM VAN 
GENUGTEN, THE WORLD BANK GROUP, THE IMF AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CONTEXTUALISED WAY 
FORWARD (2015); THE FRONTIERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND ITS 
CHALLENGES (Nehal Bhuta ed., 2016); DUTIES ACROSS BORDERS: ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS (Bård A. Andreassen & Võ Khánh Vinh eds., 2016); 
EXTRATERRITORIAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS FROM AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE (Lilian 
Chenwi & Takele Soboka Bulto eds., 2018). 
19  See, for example, Margot E. Salomon, Is There a Legal Duty to Address World Poverty? (EUI Working 
Papers, Law 2012/03); Takhmina Karimova, The Nature and Meaning of ‘International Assistance and 
Cooperation’ under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, 
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 163 
(Eibe Riedel et al. eds. 2014); VANDENBOGAERDE, supra note 6. 
20  See, for example, PHILIPP DANN, THE LAW OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD BANK, THE E.U. AND GERMANY (2013); MARKUS KALTENBORN, SOCIAL 
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: GLOBAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR THE POST-2015 
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (2015); TAHMINA KARIMOVA, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016). 
21  For an analysis of institutional global obligations, see, for example, Arne Vandenbogaerde, The Right 
to Development in International Human Rights Law: A Call for its Dissolution, 31 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 187 
(2013); Thomas Pogge & Mitu Sengupta, Assessing the Sustainable Development Goals from a Human 
Rights Perspective, 32 J. INT’L & COMP. SOC. POL’Y 83 (2016). 
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(whether they are obligations of conduct or obligations of result; interactional or 
institutional obligations; obligations of distributive or relational justice); their 
right-holders (individuals, societies, or states); and their duty-bearers (states, 
special institutions, IGOs, NSAs, individuals, or the international community as a 
whole). The specification of the exact content and scope of global obligations 
corresponding to certain socio-economic rights, as well as rules and methods of 
attributing them to particular categories of actors, goes beyond the scope of this 
Article and requires further careful research. 
This Article applies a methodology that aspires to uncover the interrelations 
between philosophical discourse, normative legal order, and legal practice. Many 
distinguished moral, political, and legal philosophers from the two camps of 
statists (nationalists) and cosmopolitans, in debating the duties owed to non-
compatriots (those living outside the borders of one’s state), have taken several 
important steps on the path toward the justification of global obligations.22 These 
debates have promoted the recognition of global obligations in world politics, as 
well as their anchoring in core international hard and soft law instruments. The 
potential of philosophy in solving fundamental problems relating to global 
obligations, however, has been considerably underestimated and underexploited 
in legal theory and practice. This Article contributes to bridging the gap between 
philosophy and law by demonstrating how contemporary theories of global justice 
can further the justification, conceptualization, allocation, and implementation of 
global obligations. The Article translates philosophical ideas into the language of 
law and incorporates empirical findings relating to global obligations. At the same 
time, it explores whether human rights theory and practice regarding global 
obligations are capable of, and essential to, solving widely debated issues of global 
justice. 
In this respect, the Article approaches the subject of global obligations from 
two sides. On the one hand, it defends a human-centered cosmopolitan 
conception of justice, which justifies and specifies our obligations towards non-
compatriots, as a guideline for reforming the existing legal framework and 
institutional design relating to global obligations. On the other hand, it shows that 
these changes are also required by the fundamental norms and principles of 
international human rights law. In this sense, the Article consolidates so-called 
“ideal” and “conservative” aspects of justice.23 It appeals to ideal justice by 
contending that philosophical justifications of what is “just” in the global domain 
                                                 
22  See Section II.B below. 
23  “Conservative” justice focuses on existing norms, institutions, and practices, whereas “ideal” justice 
calls for reforming such norms, institutions, and practices. See David Miller, Justice, in THE 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2017), http://perma.cc/5U2X-
XNZ3. 
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provide strong reasons for improving existing legal instruments, institutions, and 
practices in the sphere of human rights. However, it is also conservative in the 
sense that it proceeds from the assumption that improving the global order 
through the recognition and implementation of global obligations does not require 
creating new human rights entitlements, but rather guaranteeing the universal 
realization of human rights, in particular basic socio-economic rights, already 
enshrined in the International Bill of Human Rights.24   
This Article proceeds with Section II, which undertakes a normative analysis 
of duties towards non-compatriots as human rights obligations. Following it, 
Section III explores the extent to which extraterritorial duties should be 
acknowledged and implemented as shared human rights obligations of multiple 
actors. Section IV broadly outlines a concept of global human rights obligations 
and analyzes what global obligations should be realized in the domains of 
relational and distributive justice. Finally, Section V offers a general conclusion. 
II.  OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS NON-COMPATRIOTS  
The dominant historical and contemporary view is that states should respect, 
protect, and fulfill the socio-economic rights solely of their own citizens and 
residents.25 This Section demonstrates that this position is highly questionable and 
underpins states’ human rights obligations towards individuals beyond their 
borders.26 It starts with an examination of human-centricity and its main elements, 
which are recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and 
which serve as justifying bases for global obligations (Section II.A). Next, this 
Section explains why and to what extent the concept of global obligations 
proposed in this Article is inspired by cosmopolitan intuitions, and what statist 
ideas it incorporates (Section II.B). Then, it offers the foundation of the particular 
conception of cosmopolitanism to be developed in this Article (Section II.C). This 
Section concludes by conceptualizing global obligations as human rights 
obligations (Section II.D). 
  
                                                 
24  The International Bill of Human Rights is traditionally considered to include the UDHR, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and Optional Protocols to both Covenants. See 
OHCHR, Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev.1), The International Bill of Human Rights, http://perma.cc/937L-RU86.   
25  See ETO Consortium, supra note 7, at 3; ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF 
NON-STATE ACTORS 1 (2006). 
26  Extraterritorial obligations of major global actors (IGOs, NSAs and individuals) are discussed in 
Section III.B. 
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A.  Individual as the Ultimate Unit of Moral and Legal Concern  
The UDHR proclaims that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights.”27 This internationally-recognized norm contains several 
important elements. First, each person is a bearer of inalienable dignity and human 
rights, or, in other words, possesses a special moral and legal status. Second, 
individuals are equal in a certain fundamental sense, as holders of dignity and 
human rights, and should be treated and regarded as equals (basic equality). Third, 
dignity and human rights belong to a person as a member of a human society and 
not because of their special political connection with any state (membership in 
humanity). All three principles are interdependent and presuppose one another. 
They underlie an idea of human-centricity that sees an individual as the ultimate 
unit of both moral and legal concern,28 an absolute value and supreme goal of 
social, legal, political, and economic development at both local and global levels.29 
The organization of the contemporary global order, marked by extreme 
poverty and inequality, fails to fulfill the idea of human-centricity that is embodied 
in the UDHR in three interrelated ways.  
First, approximately 800 million people worldwide suffer from preventable 
extreme poverty. Poverty is the cause of the death of one child every five seconds 
and generally of every third person on the planet.30 This situation is incompatible 
with a special moral and legal status of a person as a possessor of human dignity and 
human rights. Extreme poverty is characterized by individuals’ severe material 
                                                 
27 UDHR, supra note 2, at art. 1. Being a key document signed by all member states of the U.N., the 
UDHR embodies a universal political agreement on fundamental human rights (see Section II.D 
below) and is considered to form an essential part of customary international law (see Section III.B 
below). Cf. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pmbl., Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, pmbl., 
Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
28  The term an “ultimate unit of moral concern” is used by political philosophers Thomas Pogge and 
Kok-Chor Tan. See Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48, 48–49 (1992); 
KOK-CHOR TAN, JUSTICE WITHOUT BORDERS: COSMOPOLITANISM, NATIONALISM, AND 
PATRIOTISM 1 (2004). I focus not just on the moral, but also on the legal status of a person. See also 
Anne Peters, Membership in the Global Constitutional Community, in JAN KLABBERS ET AL., THE 
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 153, 155 (2009). 
29  The principle of human-centricity is compatible with the acknowledgement of value of the other 
species. 
30  See MARCUS MANUEL ET AL., FINANCING THE END OF EXTREME POVERTY 9 (2018), 
http://perma.cc/W6WK-PCNK; Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 21, at 86. According to UNICEF, 
in 2018, 6.2 million children under 15 years, out of which 5.3 million children under five, died 
mostly from preventable or treatable poverty-related causes. See UNICEF, Levels and Trends in Child 
Mortality (2019), http://perma.cc/QMS9-ANS8. 
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deprivation, social exclusion, powerlessness, marginalization, and stigmatization. 
In the Author’s view, one of the most essential and tragic hallmarks of poverty, 
which contradicts human-centricity, is the feelings of indignity, worthlessness, and 
“nobodiness” experienced by the poor. Catholic priest and lifelong advocate for 
the poor, Fr. Joseph Wresinski succeeded in expressing these feelings:  
For the very poor tell us over and over again that man’s greatest misfortune 
is not to be hungry or unable to read, nor even to be without work. The greatest 
misfortune of all is to know that you count for nothing, to the point where even your suffering 
is ignored. The worst blow of all is the contempt on the part of your fellow 
citizens. For it is that contempt which stands between a human being and his 
rights. It makes the world disdain what you are going through and prevents 
you from being recognized as worthy and capable of taking on responsibility. 
The greatest misfortune of extreme poverty is that for your entire existence you are like 
someone already dead.31 
Second, world poverty and extreme inequality32 are inconsistent with basic 
equality between individuals because they divide people into first-class and second-
class humans. In the words of contemporary legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron, 
basic equality proceeds from the assumption that “fundamentally there is just one 
sort of human being, just one rank of humanity.”33 In today’s world, individuals’ 
place of birth, residence, and their special political ties with the state strongly shape 
not only their enjoyment of basic rights but all their life prospects.34 As economist 
Branko Milanovic argues, we can distinguish between a “citizenship premium,” 
held by those born in the “right” countries, and a “citizenship penalty” imposed 
on those born in the “wrong” places.35 
It is a commonly-held belief that only few contemporary political cultures 
deny the equality of people as humans.36 The current global institutional structure, 
however, stands in stark contradiction with such an optimistic view. Rather than 
expressing respect for human dignity and human rights,37 that structure reinforces 
                                                 
31  Joseph Wresinski, The Very Poor, Living Proof of the Indivisibility of Human Rights, in EXTREME POVERTY 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON JOSEPH WRESINSKI 20 (Quentin Wodon ed., 2000) (emphasis 
added). 
32  According to Oxfam, in 2018, 26 people had the same wealth as the poorest half of humanity (3.8 
billion people living under $5.50 per day). See MAX LAWSON ET AL., PUBLIC GOOD OR PRIVATE 
WEALTH? 12 (2019), http://perma.cc/A8QT-9JCB. The poor’s share in global income amounts to 
only about 2 percent. See Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 21, at 86. 
33  JEREMY WALDRON, ONE ANOTHER’S EQUALS: THE BASIS OF HUMAN EQUALITY 6 (2017). 
34  See TAN, supra note 28, at 28.
 
35  BRANKO MILANOVIC, GLOBAL INEQUALITY: A NEW APPROACH FOR THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
131 (2016). 
36  See, for example, WALDRON, supra note 33, at 7 (noting that modern differences in “sortal status” that 
“categorize[] legal subjects on the basis of the sort of person they are” are difficult to find).  
37  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 386 (rev. ed. 1999). 
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the norms and practices infringing them. The unjust international order, like many 
national orders, results in branding the poor as a different kind of human being 
and internalizing the feelings of such stigma in the impoverished themselves.38 
The extraterritorial actions and policies of developed states, including their 
development assistance programs, are often based on standards that citizens of 
these states would never agree to apply domestically. 
Third, in the modern state-centered world, the enjoyment of human dignity 
and human rights depends on the state’s ability and desire to guarantee it for its 
citizens and residents. In cases of arbitrariness, inaction, or weakness of state 
authorities, individuals cannot exercise these fundamental entitlements associated 
with their membership in humanity. In such cases, the enjoyment of human dignity 
and human rights is possible only if appropriate arrangements are made at the 
supranational level. Membership in humanity gives rise to the right to a just global 
order in which human dignity and human rights are ensured. Those individuals 
whose human rights are ignored or violated by their state should be able to claim 
their realization through joint efforts by the members of the international 
community. 
This idea resonates with the conception of the “right to have rights” 
advanced by political philosopher Hannah Arendt. According to one of her 
interpretations of this right, it is the “right of every individual to belong to 
humanity” that is to be guaranteed by humanity itself.39 As contemporary political 
thinker Seyla Benhabib elaborates, humanity is “the addressee of the claim that 
one ‘should be acknowledged as a member [of],’” and receive protection from, 
human society.40 Building on the analysis of Arendt and Benhabib, we can 
conclude that humanity as a whole is bound by an obligation to construct global 
institutions through which human rights associated with membership in humanity 
may be realized. Translating this philosophical proposition into the language of 
law, the right to have rights can be interpreted as the entitlement to a just global 
order expressed in Article 28 of the UDHR.41 
In this respect, global obligations represent a significant tool for the 
realization of individuals’ essential entitlements to their special moral and legal 
                                                 
38  See, for example, ROBERT WALKER, THE SHAME OF POVERTY (2014); POVERTY AND SHAME: GLOBAL 
EXPERIENCES (Elaine Chase & Grace Bantebya-Kyomuhendo eds., 2014); THE SHAME OF IT: 
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ANTI-POVERTY POLICY (Erika K. Gubrium et al. eds., 2013). 
39  HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 298 (rev. ed. 1968). 
40  SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS 58 (2004); see also 
ALISON KESBY, THE RIGHT TO HAVE RIGHTS: CITIZENSHIP, HUMANITY, AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2012). 
41  The UDHR entitles all individuals “to a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in [the UDHR] can be fully realized.” UDHR, supra note 2, at art. 28. See Section 
IV.A below. 
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status, basic equality, and membership in humanity and to the elimination of the 
main obstacles to the enjoyment of these entitlements, namely poverty and 
extreme inequality. 
B.  Why Cosmopolitanism? 
For more than half a century, issues surrounding negative and positive duties 
towards non-compatriots have been at the center of intensive philosophical 
debates between statists arguing for inter-state justice42 and cosmopolitans 
pleading for global justice.43 The modern versions of statism and cosmopolitanism 
provide a wide range of interpretations of moral, political, and legal dimensions 
of global obligations. Despite their discrepancies, however, these approaches are 
not strictly polar.44 Advocates of both approaches recognize certain duties towards 
non-compatriots. Their differences arise from their understandings of the 
normative basis, nature, status, conditions, content, and scope of these duties.45 
While the concept of global obligations developed in this Article is guided 
predominantly by cosmopolitan ideas, some statist arguments are also taken into 
consideration. The primary reasons why this Article elaborates a cosmopolitan 
approach to global obligations are discussed below. 
First, this Article proceeds from a cosmopolitan assumption of the possibility 
of arriving at a universal concept of justice that expresses a global political consensus between 
                                                 
42  See, for example, MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 
(1983) [hereinafter SPHERES OF JUSTICE]; MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT 
AT HOME AND ABROAD (1994) [hereinafter THICK AND THIN]; WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE 
VERNACULAR: NATIONALISM, MULTICULTURALISM, AND CITIZENSHIP (2001); Robert E. Goodin, 
What Is So Special About Our Fellow Countrymen?, 98 ETHICS 663 (1988); Thomas Nagel, The Problem 
of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113 (2005); RICHARD MILLER, GLOBALIZING JUSTICE: THE 
ETHICS OF POVERTY AND POWER (2010). 
43  See, for example, Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229 (1972); PETER 
UNGER, LIVING HIGH AND LETTING DIE: OUR ILLUSION OF INNOCENCE (1996); HENRY SHUE, 
BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2d ed. 1996); CHARLES R. 
BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (rev. ed. 1999); SIMON CANEY, 
JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS: A GLOBAL POLITICAL THEORY (2005); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, 
FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE.: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006); THOMAS POGGE, 
WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COSMOPOLITAN RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS (2d ed. 
2008) [hereinafter WORLD POVERTY]; THOMAS POGGE, POLITICS AS USUAL: WHAT LIES BEHIND 
THE PRO-POOR RHETORIC (2010) [hereinafter POLITICS]; TAN, supra note 28; Richard J. Arneson, 
What Do We Owe to Distant Needy Strangers?, in PETER SINGER UNDER FIRE: THE MORAL ICONOCLAST 
FACES HIS CRITICS (Jeffrey Schaler ed., 2009). 
44  For the possibility of convergence of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, see TAN, supra note 28, at 
85–106; Rainer Forst, Towards a Critical Theory of Transnational Justice, 32 METAPHILOSOPHY 161 
(2001). 
45  Forst, Tan and Caney provide an excellent overview of the main arguments of statism and 
cosmopolitanism. See Forst, supra note 44, at 160–65; TAN, supra note 28, at 85; CANEY, supra note 
43, at 1–15. 
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people sharing various views on justice.46 In a multicultural world, the concept of global 
justice should be the result of an overlapping consensus, which is reached 
politically, that is, independently from any comprehensive (ideological, 
philosophical, religious, and cultural) doctrines.47 This approach within an 
overlapping consensus, or an ethical minimum, theory is called justificatory 
minimalism. In contrast to substantive minimalism, it seeks not an intersection of 
various values, but a practical convergence as a basis for universal rules.48 
Internationally-recognized human rights best confirm the correctness of 
cosmopolitan intuitions regarding not only the possibility, but also the existence, 
of a universal normative basis for global justice.49 This Article develops the idea 
of human rights as a product of an overlapping consensus and a foundation for a 
political conception of global justice; and on this basis, elaborates a human rights-
based version of cosmopolitanism. Human rights represent “globally uniform 
minimum standards for the treatment [of individuals]”50 by states, other global 
actors, and the international community as a whole. It is important to add that the 
results of this political consensus are not only human rights themselves, but also 
essential underlying principles of human rights law (such as the principle of 
human-centricity embodied in Article 1 of the UDHR). 
                                                 
46  Cf. statists’ arguments that a national affinity—a common understanding of what is just shared by 
members of a community—is an important precondition for relations of justice. From their 
perspective, an autonomous, full-blooded concept of global justice is impossible, since it always has 
a local root system that feeds it. See THICK AND THIN, supra note 42, at 4. 
47  The concept of an “overlapping consensus” was developed by a political philosopher John Rawls. 
See John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7–8 (1987); John 
Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 247 (1985); John Rawls, The 
Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, in DEBATES IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY: AN ANTHOLOGY 160 (Derek Matravers & Jon Pike eds., 2003). 
48  On justificatory and substantive minimalism, see Joshua Cohen, Minimalism About Human Rights: The 
Most We Can Hope For?, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 190, 192 (2004); DAVID MILLER, NATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 172 (2007) [hereinafter RESPONSIBILITY]; Charles R. Beitz, 
Human Rights as a Common Concern, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 269 (2001); Charles Taylor, Conditions of an 
Unforced Consensus on Human Rights, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 124 
(Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 5–6 (2000). 
49  For instance, a philosopher and a member of the French National Commission of UNESCO 
involved in the discussion of the UDHR’s draft, Jacques Maritain, maintained that the Declaration 
was a product of a political agreement between “proponents of violently opposed ideologies”: “Yes, 
they replied, we agreed on these rights, providing we are not asked why. With the ‘why’, the dispute 
begins.” Jacques Maritain, Introduction, in UNESCO, HUMAN RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND 
INTERPRETATIONS 9 (1950); JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 76–77 (1951). For an 
analysis of Maritain’s human rights conception, see Elena Pribytkova, Natural Law and Natural Rights 
According to Vladimir Solovyov and Jacques Maritain, in ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
69 (Alfons Brüning & Evert van der Zweerde eds., 2012). 
50  POLITICS, supra note 43, at 10. 
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Second, as opposed to statist approaches, which favor the development of 
international justice treating states as the key agents in the global arena, the 
cosmopolitan conception deployed in this Article concentrates on global justice, 
maintaining that persons are major subjects and right-holders.51 This Article argues 
that principles of global justice should penetrate states’ borders and directly 
regulate relations of individuals with multiple global actors.52  
The conflict between statist and cosmopolitan attitudes is reflected in the 
dualism of contemporary international law. While public international law 
regulating inter-state relations proceeds from statist assumptions, international 
human rights law focusing on entitlements of individuals is based on 
cosmopolitan ideas. Drawing inspiration from cosmopolitanism, this Article 
contends that taking human rights seriously necessarily entails a shift from a state-
centered to a human-centered approach, and from international justice to global 
justice. At the same time, this Article gives consideration to statist arguments that 
the state should remain an important actor in the international community and a 
defender of the human rights and fundamental interests of its people. 
Third, proponents of statism assert that relations of justice presuppose a well-
established and institutionalized social cooperation that the contemporary 
international order lacks.53 I agree with cosmopolitan theorists, who, relying in 
part on convincing empirical evidence of intensive present-day global cooperation 
among various actors, conclude that we already have a certain global institutional 
scheme.54 This scheme is considerably less developed than national or regional 
schemes, is extremely unfair, and infringes human dignity and human rights. 
However, this imbalance between national and global institutional structures 
further supports the cosmopolitan prescription that a global structure should be 
improved.55 As this Article elaborates, individuals’ entitlement to membership in 
humanity gives rise to the right to a just global order, which binds all members of 
the international community to a shared obligation to create and maintain fair 
global institutions. Principles of justice are therefore to be applied universally and 
                                                 
51  Thomas Pogge identifies three main features of cosmopolitanism: all persons are equally considered 
(universality) to be the ultimate units of moral concern (individualism) for everyone in the world 
(generality). See Pogge, supra note 28, at 48–49.  
52  Statist approaches propose that the operation of the principles of international justice governing 
relations between states apply only across the borders of sovereign states, while the relationship 
between individuals falls exclusively within the ambit of national social justice. See RAWLS, supra note 
37, at 6–7; JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLE 119–20 (1999). 
53  See Nagel, supra note 42, at 113–14, 121–22. 
54  See, for example, Forst, supra note 44, at 163; BEITZ, supra note 43, at 143–44; POLITICS, supra note 43, 
at 10–25; TAN, supra note 28, at 27–28.  
55  See Henry Shue, Mediating Duties, 98 ETHICS 687 (1988). 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 398 Vol. 20 No. 2 
to correct global injustice to the same degree that they (should) apply and correct 
local injustice.56 
Fourth, this Article advocates for the cosmopolitan view that global principles 
of justice can serve as instruments for improving institutions and practices both domestically and 
worldwide.57 Acting separately and jointly through their participation in IGOs, as 
well as by regulating and influencing the conduct of NSAs and individuals, states 
represent their people. Individuals have justified interests in their states not 
infringing upon the human dignity and human rights of people abroad, and share 
obligations to prevent these infringements.58 Thus, states’ implementation of 
global obligations pertaining to human rights is on behalf of and in the justified 
interests of the people they represent. Since a just national order does not 
guarantee a non-violation of human rights extraterritorially,59 territorial human 
rights obligations should be supplemented by extraterritorial ones, while national 
norms, institutions, and practices should be brought into accord with principles 
of global justice.60  
Fifth, like other supporters of cosmopolitanism, I consider the guarantees 
of a decent social minimum to be at the core of social and global justice and to require the 
realization of basic socio-economic rights universally.61 This Article argues that the capacity 
to be a holder of fundamental socio-economic rights is not connected with 
membership in any society except the human one.62 Relatedly, based on 
                                                 
56  BEITZ, supra note 43, at 143–53; Thomas Pogge, Rawls and Global Justice, 18 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF 
PHILOSOPHY 227, 243 (1988); TAN, supra note 28, at 28; Forst, supra note 44, at 165. 
57  Statists view demands of global justice rather as a threat to domestic relations of social justice, and 
positive duties towards non-compatriots are seen as contradicting the fundamental interests of 
compatriots, especially those relating to the enjoyment of socio-economic rights. See Nagel, supra 
note 42, at 131–32. 
58  Political philosopher Henry Shue is persuasive in his insistence that a government that violates 
human rights of people abroad is “failing in its duties both to the victims of the deprivation and, as 
an agent with service duties, to its own population.” SHUE, supra note 43, at 152. 
59  See Forst, supra note 44, at 173. 
60  SHUE, supra note 43, at 131. The improvement of local norms, institutions, and practices required 
by global justice includes, for example, institutionalizing human rights impact assessments (HRIAs) 
and human rights due diligence (HRDD) and implementing them with regard to all projects and 
policies which might affect the enjoyment of human rights abroad; creating accountability 
mechanisms to guarantee the right to remedies to those suffering from extraterritorial human rights 
violations; and accumulating means for global assistance. 
61  I disagree with proponents of statism, who believe that special relations within a particular society 
are a key condition for exercising socio-economic rights. See, for example, Nagel, supra note 42, at 
127, 131–32. 
62  Advocates of cosmopolitanism argue that it is necessary to distinguish between fundamental ties 
that bind all of mankind and complementary bonds between members of certain communities. See 
Johann Frick, National Partiality, Immigration, and the Problem of Double-Jeopardy 4–5, 
http://perma.cc/K829-9N6F. Being a product of global political consensus, basic socio-economic 
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cosmopolitan intuitions, international human rights law also recognizes that, 
unlike political rights (the implementation of which should be ensured by the state 
within its jurisdiction), the enjoyment of basic socio-economic rights is not 
conditioned on political bonds between an individual and the state.63 In many 
contexts, territorial and extraterritorial obligations corresponding to basic socio-
economic rights are simultaneous and equal in their content and scope.64 In some 
situations, however, as proponents of statism rightly assert, global obligations are 
limited in scope, and are conditional and secondary in comparison to territorial 
ones.65 
Thus, cosmopolitan ideas—that (1) human rights, as a result of a universal 
overlapping consensus, (2) underlie a political concept of global justice and (3) 
require shifting from a state-centered to human-centered global order, and (4) 
supplementing and harmonizing principles and institutions of domestic justice 
with those of global justice and territorial obligations with extraterritorial ones—
ground the idea that states are bound by global human rights obligations. At the 
same time, some statist arguments—on (1) the significant role of the state in the 
realization of human rights and corresponding obligations; (2) the necessity of 
institutionalized social cooperation for relations of justice; and (3) the limits of 
some global obligations in comparison to territorial ones—remain relevant for 
conceptualizing states’ global obligations. 
C. What Cosmopolitanism? 
As the previous Section demonstrated, the justification of global obligations 
relies predominantly on a cosmopolitan interpretation of justice. This Section will 
briefly outline special features of the cosmopolitan conception, which this Article 
elaborates and upon which a convincing understanding of global obligations can 
be based. 
First, this Article develops a cosmopolitan approach to global justice, which is 
concerned with the role of compatriot ties for determining the content and scope 
                                                 
rights represent, in Shue’s apt words, “everyone’s minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of 
humanity. They are the rational basis for justified demands the denial of which no self-respecting 
person can reasonably be expected to accept.” SHUE, supra note 43, at 19.  
63  While the ICCPR contains jurisdiction clauses, the ICESCR does not have these limitations. See 
ICCPR, supra note 27, at art. 2(1); ICESCR, supra note 27, at art. 2(1). 
64  Some cosmopolitans believe that obligations towards fellow countrymen and foreigners are 
identical. See, for example, Singer, supra note 43; UNGER, supra note 43. Pogge demonstrates that under 
certain conditions, remedial extraterritorial obligations may prevail over national obligations. See 
WORLD POVERTY, supra note 43, at 124–51. 
65  See Section IV.A below. 
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of global obligations aimed at promoting social justice universally.66 
Second, it proposes a human rights-based cosmopolitan conception67 of global justice 
and justifies global obligations as human rights obligations of multiple actors. By 
their nature, human rights are cosmopolitan demands that proceed from the 
assumption that a person is the ultimate unit of moral and legal concern and a 
major subject of justice.  
Third, this Article argues that global obligations are moral obligations that 
should receive legal recognition and implementation at international, regional, and 
national levels. Thus, it explicates a type of legal cosmopolitanism.68 
Fourth, it underscores the close interrelation between interactional cosmopolitanism69 
(which formulates ethical principles directly regulating the conduct of global 
actors) and institutional cosmopolitanism (which postulates principles of justice that 
apply to a global institutional structure).70 This Article defends the thesis that 
                                                 
66  For classification of cosmopolitanism as a “doctrine about justice” and a “doctrine about culture,” 
see, for example, SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES: PROBLEMS OF JUSTICE AND 
RESPONSIBILITY IN LIBERAL THOUGHT 111 (2001); TAN, supra note 28, at 11. An analysis of cultural 
cosmopolitanism, which focuses on the relevance of cultural ties for individuals’ identity, falls 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
67  Various human rights-based cosmopolitan approaches are developed in SHUE, supra note 43; 
WORLD POVERTY, supra note 43; CANEY, supra note 43. For other normative grounds—in 
capabilities-based (Amartya Sen & Martha Nussbaum), needs-based (David Miller), utilitarian (Peter 
Singer), contractarian (Charles Beitz & Darrel Moellendorf) approaches—see Singer, supra note 43; 
Amartya Sen, Justice Across Borders, in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON 
THE MORAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION 37 (Pablo de Greiff & Ciaran 
Cronin eds., 2002); NUSSBAUM, supra note 48; RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 48; Beitz, supra note 48; 
DARREL MOELLENDORF, COSMOPOLITAN JUSTICE (2002). For an analysis of various cosmopolitan 
approaches, see Gillian Brock, Contemporary Cosmopolitanism: Some Current Issues, 8 PHIL. COMPASS 
689, 690–91 (2013); CANEY, supra note 43, at 3–7; TAN, supra note 28, at 93–98. 
68  See Section II.D below. My interpretation of legal cosmopolitanism differs from the canonical one 
suggested by Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge who differentiate between moral cosmopolitanism 
(that concerns moral relations between individuals) and institutional, or legal, cosmopolitanism (that 
calls for a universal citizenship in a world state). See BEITZ, supra note 43, at 287; Pogge, supra note 
28, at 49; TAN, supra note 28, at 10. Beitz’ and Pogge’s use of the terms “institutional” or “legal” 
cosmopolitanism suggests that legal regulation and institutionalization of global obligations must 
invariably be connected with a world state. This understanding follows from a state-centered vision 
of human rights and is incompatible with human-centered and polycentric approaches developed 
in this Article. As this Section will show, legal cosmopolitanism does not presuppose the creation 
of a world state. See Cristina Lafont, Accountability and Global Governance: Challenging the State-Centric 
Conception of Human Rights, 3 ETHICS & GLOBAL POLITICS 193, 198–99 (2010). 
69  For various interactional conceptions of human rights, see SHUE, supra note 43; CANEY, supra note 
43; John Tasioulas, The Moral Reality of Human Rights, in FREEDOM FROM POVERTY AS A HUMAN 
RIGHT: WHO OWES WHAT TO THE VERY POOR? 75 (Thomas Pogge ed., 2007); JAMES GRIFFIN, ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2008).  
70  Different versions of institutional approach are represented in WORLD POVERTY, supra note 43; 
POLITICS, supra note 43; BEITZ, supra note 43; TAN, supra note 28; Mathias Risse, How Does the Global 
Order Harm the Poor?, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 349 (2005); MOELLENDORF, supra note 67. 
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global obligations include both interactional duties of ethics and institutional 
duties of justice.71 The realization of socio-economic rights universally requires a 
just global institutional scheme. The creation and maintenance of this institutional 
scheme, in turn, is hardly possible without the implementation of human rights 
obligations by global actors in specific extraterritorial relations. On this premise, 
the position defended in this Article differs from traditional approaches in two 
important aspects: (1) whereas obligations to create a just institutional scheme are 
often interpreted as duties of distributive justice,72 I consider a fair global 
institutional structure to be aimed, in the first place, at guaranteeing basic equality 
that has both relational and distributive implications;73 (2) though institutional and 
interactional obligations are frequently treated as moral cosmopolitan duties,74 I 
elaborate on their legal conception.  
Fifth, this Article develops a weak, or sufficientist, cosmopolitan conception of 
relational and distributive justice.75 It demonstrates that global obligations are aimed 
not at eliminating inequality between persons worldwide, but at ensuring certain 
minimum relational and distributive guarantees that are sufficient for the 
enjoyment of basic equality. In this respect, individuals should be empowered to 
participate fully in all core global institutions and practices, including essential 
decision-making processes, and have secure access to a global social minimum. 
Sixth, this Article proceeds from the assumption that a world state76 is neither 
                                                 
71  The difference between duties of global ethics and duties of global justice is easier to understand 
through the following criteria: (1) when global ethics regulates interpersonal (interactional) relations 
between various individual and collective actors, global justice focuses on global institutional 
structure; (2) while ethical claims are direct claims against other actors, demands of justice are 
addressed first against social and political institutions and, indirectly, against agents contributing to 
these institutions’ functioning; (3) while duties of ethics are usually “limited-term commitments 
with a definable goal” (for instance, disaster relief or international assistance in times of emergency), 
duties of justice are systematic and ongoing commitments (for example, combating poverty and 
extreme inequality). TAN, supra note 28, at 21–23. It is important to note that not only moral but 
also legal human rights obligations belong to domains of ethics and justice. 
72  BEITZ, supra note 43, at 125; WORLD POVERTY, supra note 43, at 43–45; TAN, supra note 28, at 19. 
73  See Sections IV.B–IV.D below. 
74  Pogge, supra note 28, at 49. 
75  See Sections IV.B–IV.D below. The principle of sufficiency is explicated in Section IV.D. 
76  The possibility of global institutional order, for which cosmopolitans call, to transform into a world 
state causes concern among supporters of both nationalism and cosmopolitanism. See Nagel, supra 
note 42, at 115; Forst, supra note 44, at 162. According to Arendt, the creation of a world state 
would mean the end of world politics. See HANNAH ARENDT, MEN IN DARK TIMES 82 (1968). For 
cosmopolitan arguments against a world state, see Pogge, supra note 28, at 63; TAN, supra note 28, 
at 93–96; Lafont, supra note 68, at 194; CRISTINA LAFONT, Challenging the State-Centric Conception of 
Human Rights without Endorsing the Ideal of a World State, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 45 (2012); Rafael Domingo, The New Global Human Community, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 563, 567, 
583 (2012). 
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necessary nor possible in the global political domain. On the one hand, this Article 
considers that the enjoyment of rights associated with individuals’ membership in 
a particular state is essential and should be guaranteed to them. On the other hand, 
it calls for a polycentric global institutional structure established through cooperation among 
autonomous members of the international community, including sovereign states.77 This 
requires increasing the role of IGOs, NSAs (including international NGOs and 
transnational corporations (TNCs)), and individuals in the universal realization of 
basic socio-economic rights, while also increasing the human rights accountability 
of these actors. In this context, traditional state-centered governance and 
accountability modes should be harmonized with alternative, informal, and non-
bureaucratic institutional solutions.78 In combination with the acknowledgement 
of individuals as major subjects of justice, this will lead to the state losing its 
monopoly in the international arena and promote a shift from a state-centered to 
a human-centered global institutional order. 
In sum, this Article develops a cosmopolitan conception of justice that 
advocates for both interactional and institutional global human rights obligations 
and justifies the necessity for their legal recognition, regulation, and 
implementation within the polycentric global community of multiple autonomous 
actors.  
D.  Towards a Human Rights -Based Cosmopolitanism 
This Section explains why the recognition of global obligations as human 
rights obligations is essential. Human rights are often defined as legitimate 
entitlements that individuals have against relevant others.79 Human rights have 
several important features. They are (1) universal, (2) high-priority entitlements, 
that (3) call for legal recognition, (4) give rise to corresponding obligations of 
certain actors, and (5) are grounds for taking international actions against those 
actors. In addition, human rights have both interactional and institutional aspects: 
they are claims on “the behavior of individual and collective agents, and on the 
design of social arrangements.”80 These characteristics of human rights are key to 
understanding the nature of human rights-based global obligations. 
                                                 
77  For a large diapason of possible organizational forms of the global order, see Michael Walzer, 
Governing the Globe: What Is the Best We Can Do?, DISSENT MAGAZINE (2000), 
http://perma.cc/RM4G-J865. 
78  See Elena Pribytkova, Global Human Rights Obligations Relating to a Decent Standard of Living 
202–17 (2019) (J.S.D. dissertation, Columbia University). 
79  See, for example, SHUE, supra note 43, at 13; JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 13–15 (2d 
ed. 2007); JEFF KING, JUDGING SOCIAL RIGHTS 20–21 (2012). 
80  UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 25 (2000). See also Section II.C above. 
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First, there are lively debates about how we should understand the universality 
of human rights. Article 1 of the UDHR reflects a political consensus not only on 
the principle that all people are bearers of human rights, but also that they possess 
these rights because they belong to the human race. This idea underlies the 
principle of universality of human rights. Nevertheless, the principle itself and its 
traditional understanding are often criticized.81 For instance, contemporary legal 
philosopher Joseph Raz opposes the interpretation of universality, according to 
which human rights belong to people by virtue of their humanity alone. He claims 
that human rights are not diachronically, but rather synchronically, universal. In 
other words, they are the rights that “all people living today have.”82 Rightly noting 
that people have not possessed human rights at all times, Raz considers the 
existence of human rights to be dependent on social, economic, and cultural 
factors.83 One can hardly agree with this account. If the presence of favorable 
socio-economic conditions is essential for the existence of human rights, it would 
be incorrect to speak about the synchronic universality of human rights. Many 
poor states do not enjoy the “common conditions of life” necessary for the (full) 
realization of human rights. Nevertheless, these states have recognized human 
rights, because (for various reasons) they believe that these minimum normative 
standards should serve as universal regulative guidelines, and thereby have 
expressed their intention to undertake all efforts for their realization 
independently and in cooperation with (members of) the international 
community. In this respect, human rights and corresponding (global) obligations 
exist where a universal political consensus about them is achieved and they govern 
the behavior of multiple actors. We deal with moral or legal human rights 
depending on whether this overlapping consensus is reached only in global 
political discourse or expressed in various legal sources (such as international 
human rights instruments, customary international law, and jus cogens) as well. 
Second, being a result of a universal political agreement regarding the most 
important entitlements of a person, human rights represent high-priority claims of 
individuals that surpass many other interests and entitlements. According to legal 
philosopher Ronald Dworkin’s famous definition, human rights are “political 
trumps held by individuals.”84 It is also important to point out the tradition of 
                                                 
81  See, for example, Chris Brown, Universal Human Rights: A Critique, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL 
POLITICS 103 (Tim Dunne & Nicholas J. Wheeler eds., 1999). 
82  Joseph Raz, Human Rights in the Emerging World Order, 1 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 31, 43 (2010) 
(emphasis added). 
83  Therefore, people from other epochs (for instance, the Stone Age or Ancient Rome) that lived in 
other socio-economic conditions did not possess human rights. Id. 
84  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977). For critique, see Joseph Raz, Professor 
Dworkin’s Theory of Rights, 26 POL. STUD. 123 (1978); András Sajó, Socioeconomic Rights and the 
International Economic Order, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 221, 223–24 (2002). 
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distinguishing basic rights—human rights that, as observed by Shue, “need to be 
established securely before other rights can be secured.”85 Basic human rights give 
rise to priority obligations of multiple actors and constitute a decent social 
minimum, which should be ensured universally. 
Third, human rights and corresponding obligations are ‘citizens’ of two 
worlds: moral and legal.86 This Article develops Raz’s persuasive argument that 
human rights are “moral rights that call for legal-political protection.” They are 
moral rights in the sense that their existence is independent of legal recognition; 
but at the same time, for their enforcement, they require and have the capacity to 
receive legal recognition and institutionalization.87 Since there is still no agreement 
on whether global obligations should be interpreted as moral or legal obligations,88 
this Article pursues the double goal of: (1) justifying global obligations as 
fundamental duties of justice (moral aspect); and (2) demonstrating that global 
obligations are also rooted in and correspond to human rights recognized in core 
international human rights instruments (legal aspect). In this sense, global 
obligations are viewed as morally justified legal obligations of various actors. 
Philosophical justification and conceptualization of global obligations are 
important for understanding their content and scope and should promote their 
legal recognition and implementation. 
Fourth, human rights precede and are the source of corresponding territorial and 
extraterritorial obligations. In comparison to other duties, human rights obligations 
are rooted in correlative human rights.89 It is a claim that is an essential hallmark 
of human rights, that is, human rights are claimable against the relevant duty-
bearers. Russian-Polish scholar and forerunner of the psychological conception 
                                                 
85  SHUE, supra note 43, at 20. 
86  Human rights scholar Jeff King differentiates between five meanings of socio-economic rights: (1) 
socio-economic human rights, which belong to all human beings irrespective of their legal recognition, 
and aim to guarantee a global social minimum; (2) membership in a particular society entitles 
individuals to socio-economic citizenship rights, the scope of which goes beyond a global social minimum; 
(3) international socio-economic rights embedded in contemporary international human rights law and 
“mirroring” socio-economic human rights; (4) constitutional socio-economic rights proclaimed in states’ 
constitutional law and usually requiring legislative measures for their realization; and (5) enforceable 
and justiciable legislative socio-economic rights guaranteed by states’ laws. The first two meanings refer 
to the understanding of socio-economic rights as moral rights – entitlements justified in 
contemporary political or philosophical discourse. The further three meanings characterize human 
rights as legal rights – entitlements recognized by law at various levels. In this sense, any right and 
corresponding obligation may be presented in all (or some) of these five categories. KING, supra 
note 79, at 18–19. 
87  Raz, supra note 82, at 31, 36, 43. 
88  Global obligations are frequently considered to be moral duties rather than legal obligations. See, for 
example, Samantha Besson, The Bearers of Human Rights Duties and Responsibilities for Human Rights – A 
Quiet (R)Evolution, 32 SOC. PHI. & POL’Y 244 (2015). 
89  See NICKEL, supra note 79, at 11–12; SHUE, supra note 43, at 52–53, 59–60. 
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of law, Leon Petrazycki called this characteristic an “attributive” nature of law. 
According to Petrazycki, our rights are neither more nor less than the debts other 
individuals owe to us. In this respect, right-holders are the lords of our duties to 
them.90 Thus, obligations corresponding to human rights exert a stronger 
influence on the behavior of duty-bearers than any other duties.91  
On this premise, the task of justification and conceptualization of global 
obligations as human rights obligations calls for: (1) specifying internationally-
recognized socio-economic rights that give rise to these global obligations;92 (2) 
determining and assigning corresponding individual and shared obligations to 
concrete actors (assigning extraterritorial obligations to various actors is possible 
thanks to what Raz calls the “dynamic” character of human rights, which are 
capable of generating new corresponding obligations93); and (3) undertaking 
certain institutional arrangements to guarantee human rights obligations’ 
enforceability and justiciability.94 Thus, taking socio-economic rights seriously 
requires taking corresponding global obligations seriously. Specified, allocated, 
claimable, and enforceable obligations are, according to philosopher Baroness 
Onora O’Neill, a sign that we are dealing with actual human rights and not with 
“manifesto” or “empty” rights.95 
Fifth, human rights are reasons for taking international actions against global actors. 
Justifying this thesis in relation to the state, Raz defines human rights as tools 
capable of setting limits on the sovereignty of states. This means that human rights 
are sufficient grounds for taking international action against a state that fails to 
realize its territorial human rights obligations.96 This Article contends that, since 
                                                 
90  LEON PETRAZYCKI, LAW AND MORALITY 47 (2011). 
91  Raz likewise demonstrates that “rights are grounds of duties in others,” and they exist because they 
give rise to corresponding duties. He emphasizes the priority of rights over duties and shows that 
the former “are (part of) the justification” of the latter. In Raz’s opinion, human rights obligations 
“secure (at least to some degree) the right-holder’s control over the object of his right.” JOSEPH 
RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 167–86 (1986). See also Raz, supra note 82, at 36, 39. This thesis 
is close to Petrazycki’s ideas; however, from Petrazycki’s point of view, it is the claim-right 
grounding a corresponding obligation, and not the obligation itself, that gives the right-holder 
control over the behavior of the obliged person and the object of the right.  
92  Cf. RAZ, supra note 91, at 183. 
93  Id. at 186. 
94  See TAN, supra note 28, at 51; WORLD POVERTY, supra note 43, at 70–73; HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 187–88 (2008). 
95  Onora O’Neill, The Dark Side of Human Rights, 81 INT’L AFF. 427, 191, 431 (2005); ONORA O’NEILL, 
CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 296 (1989). Cf. 
Raz, supra note 82, at 36, 39. 
96  It appears that Raz considers that states do not enjoy immunity from international interference not 
only when violating human rights, but also when failing to perform their duties to respect and 
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human rights give rise to extraterritorial obligations of all global actors, they 
provide grounds for: (1) sovereignty-limiting measures against states that fail to 
implement their human rights obligations towards individuals beyond their 
territory; and (2) taking international actions against all other global actors (IGOs, 
NSAs, and individuals) that fail to perform their extraterritorial obligations. 
What features of human rights obligations stem from the characteristics of 
human rights analyzed above? Human rights obligations are (1) universal (that is, 
their addressees are people as members of humanity) and (2) high-priority 
obligations, which (3) derive from and correspond to human rights, (4) call for 
their legal recognition at various levels, and (5) authorize sovereignty-limiting 
measures to be taken against states and international actions against all other 
members of the global community. 
Why is recognizing global obligations as human rights obligations so 
important? Raz convincingly demonstrates that not only the objects of a right 
(such as property, work, or information), but also the very possession of the right 
(which means enjoying secure access to their objects) are of value to the right-
holders.97 That is why social justice and human rights advocates contend that the 
lack of access to objects of basic socio-economic rights (such as adequate food, 
water, sanitation, housing, clothing, health, social security, and education), which 
is characteristic of poverty, reflects a serious structural human rights deficit.98 A 
human rights-based approach suggests that the human rights deficit is both a 
cause and a consequence of poverty, while human rights realization is an 
important instrument for the alleviation of poverty and extreme inequality.99 This 
approach treats the poor as holders of basic human rights to which obligations of 
members of the international community correspond. It interprets severe socio-
economic deprivations as violations of human rights of the poor and breaches of 
responsible actors’ correlative obligations. Poor individuals’ inability to exercise 
their rights, which is not causally linked to particular agents’ acts or omissions, 
gives rise to both obligations of territorial social support and global obligations to 
assist.  
                                                 
promote human rights. See Joseph Raz, Human Rights Without Foundations 9–10 (Univ. of Oxford 
Faculty of Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 14, 2007); Raz, supra note 82, at 42. 
97  Raz, supra note 82, at 36. 
98  See, for example, ActionAid, Human Rights-Based Approaches to Poverty Eradication and Development (2008), 
http://perma.cc/3SK4-PV7G. 
99  See, for example, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: poverty 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Statement, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/2001/10 (May 4, 2001). For critique of the view that human rights are aimed at and capable 
of reducing inequality, see SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 
(2018). 
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Thus, in applying a human rights-based approach and emphasizing the 
precedence of human right claims to corresponding duties, this Article 
demonstrates that global obligations are morally justified human rights obligations 
that should receive legal recognition and realization.  
E. Summary 
This Section provided a normative foundation for the conception of global 
obligations. It elaborated a human-centered account, which sees a person as the 
ultimate unit of both moral and legal concern entitled to a special moral and legal 
status, basic equality, and membership in humanity. It defended the position that, 
human-centricity, which is embedded in the International Bill of Human Rights, 
serves as a justifying basis for global obligations (Section II.A). This idea is at the 
core of an appealing cosmopolitan vision of our obligations towards non-
compatriots, though arguments made by proponents of statism should also be 
taken into account in determining the content and scope of states’ global 
obligations (Section II.B). While elaborating a human rights-based cosmopolitan 
concept of justice, this Section suggested that global obligations are best 
envisioned as morally justified human rights obligations, which should receive 
legal recognition, regulation, and implementation within the polycentric global 
community of multiple autonomous actors (Sections II.С–II.D). 
III.  EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS CORRESPONDING TO 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS  
This Section analyzes the extent to which extraterritorial duties should be 
acknowledged and implemented as shared human rights obligations of multiple 
global actors. It examines the specific character of “diagonal” legal relations and 
the significance of the recognition and realization of extraterritorial obligations 
for the shift from a state-centered to a human-centered global order (Section 
III.A), as well as the interrelation between remedial extraterritorial obligations and 
global obligations (Section III.C). It also explores global obligations borne by 
states, IGOs, NSAs, and individuals (Section III.B) and peculiarities of attributing 
global obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill socio-economic rights to those 
actors (Section III.D). 
A.  Diagonal Legal Relations:  From State-Centered to Human-
Centered Order  
Modern legal theory distinguishes several categories of legal relations: 
horizontal relations between equal actors that are not subordinate to one another 
(states, IGOs, NSAs, and individuals); vertical relations between subjects that are 
at different levels of one hierarchy (individuals and their governments; 
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organizations’ governing bodies and their members or employees); and diagonal 
relations between subjects not connected by horizontal or vertical relations 
(individuals and global actors). Horizontal, vertical, and diagonal relations are 
frequently interlinked; actors usually appear in several roles. Extraterritorial 
relations represent diagonal legal relations; they are complex and often involve 
multiple actors. 
The Westphalian state-centered model of international legal order considers 
nation states exercising exclusive sovereignty over their territory to be primary 
actors, right-holders and duty-bearers, in the world arena, while individuals are 
seen as secondary actors. In this context, primary global human rights entitlements 
and obligations are attributed to states. Individuals may often only claim and 
defend their human rights on the international level through the agency of their 
state’s government. 
Contemporary international law is, however, not homogeneous but rather 
reflects a certain dualism. While international public law regulating relations 
among states proceeds from statist assumptions and applies principles of 
international justice, international human rights law penetrating states’ borders 
and focusing on entitlements of persons is, in its main idea, cosmopolitan and 
appeals to global justice. In this sense, international human rights law has 
substantial potential to become global law.100 
Yet, contemporary international human rights law itself is riven by internal 
contradictions. It is to a large extent state-centered101 and tends to use traditional 
horizontal and vertical frameworks to regulate extraterritorial legal relations, 
which are diagonal by nature.  
The substitution of diagonal relations with horizontal and vertical ones is 
both normatively and practically inadequate. Normatively, this substitution 
disempowers the actual right-holder (an individual) and transforms a duty-bearer 
(the state) into a right-holder, which is a denial of human rights.  
The following examples explain why the substitution is also practically 
inappropriate and often leads to human rights abuses. First, the state is 
traditionally deemed the primary mediator in relations between individuals and 
NSAs, although expectations of the state’s success in this role are unjustifiably 
high (as discussed below). Second, international assistance, including the Official 
Development Aid (ODA) provided by the wealthiest donor countries as part of 
                                                 
100  See THE FRONTIERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND ITS CHALLENGES 1 (Nehal 
Bhuta ed., 2016). Louis Henkin asserted that “human rights have revolutionized the international 
system and international law. The law now reflects human values in addition to state values, or 
allows human values to modify state values.” Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”, 25 
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 43–44 (1996). 
101  Lafont, supra note 68, at 198; LAFONT, supra note 76, at 54–55. 
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their global obligations, is addressed not directly to poor individuals and 
communities to ensure their enjoyment of basic socio-economic rights, but to 
their states (horizontal relations) in order to enable states to realize territorial 
obligations towards their citizens and residents (vertical relations). This practice is 
widely marred by corruption, misuse of funds, and human rights violations, 
exacerbating rather than solving the problems of global poverty and inequality.102 
Third, there are a number of drawbacks to inter-state complaint mechanisms, 
which allow a state to file a claim against another state (horizontal relations) in 
defense of its residents (vertical relations):103 (1) they do not allow individuals to 
formulate complaints; (2) they are not accessible if a home state government itself 
participates in human rights abuses; and (3) individuals rarely benefit from inter-
state complaint procedures because states consider using them to be an 
“unfriendly act” toward other states.104  
According to legal scholar Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen’s apt expression, 
legal science and practice must make a “quantum leap” to develop adequate tools 
for analyzing and regulating a reality that does not fit into the usual framework of 
horizontal and vertical relations.105 This “quantum leap” presupposes two 
                                                 
102  On “the limited effectiveness of the use of foreign funds,” see Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural 
Rights, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the 
Covenant: Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Georgia, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1Add.83 (2002). On the “mismanagement of international 
cooperation aid and unbalanced budgetary allocations that constitute serious breaches in the 
obligations,” see Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Consideration of Reports Submitted 
by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding observations of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Democratic Republic of Congo, ¶ 16, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/COD/CO/4 (2009) [CESCR Concluding observations on Congo]. The emphasis of 
global assistance should be placed on the human rights of individuals, and not on the duties of their 
states. This can be achieved through the acknowledgement of individuals’ rights to seek global 
assistance. The state should, therefore, act solely as people’s agent rather than a sovereign addressee 
and administrator of assistance. See Pribytkova, supra note 78, at 276–82. 
103  There is no international judicial body addressing individual complaints. The two world courts, the 
International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court are able to act only on the basis 
of applications made by states (or other special subjects), but not individuals. Individuals from most 
states are still unable to access the existing UN treaty body-based individual complaint 
mechanisms—for example, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (U.N. CRC), Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (U.N. CRPD)—since such access depends on states’ ratifications of optional protocols 
to treaties, which presuppose these complaint mechanisms. 
104  See VANDENBOGAERDE, supra note 6, at 184. 
105  Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Growing Barriers: International Refugee Law, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS 80–81 (Gibney & Skogly eds., 2010). For an 
analysis of vertical and horizontal interpretations of human rights, see generally John H. Knox, 
Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2008). 
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“revolutionary” changes that will undermine the Westphalian state-centered 
paradigm and prepare a move to a human-centered world order.106  
First, it requires a shift from the dominating theory and practice of 
international justice (which view states as major moral and legal subjects)107 to that 
of global justice (which regard individuals as the ultimate units of moral and legal 
concern). While implementing the fundamental principle of human-centricity 
enshrined in the International Bill of Human Rights, international human rights 
law should recognize individuals as independent and full-fledged subjects of 
diagonal extraterritorial relations. Individuals should be seen as capable of 
claiming directly—in other words, without the mandatory mediation of the 
state—the realization of their human rights from global actors. Furthermore, 
individuals should enjoy secure and direct access to effective and affordable 
remedies in case of extraterritorial violations of their socio-economic rights by 
these actors.  
Second, it demands attributing extraterritorial obligations not only to states, 
but also to other global actors so that they are directly accountable to individuals. 
As previously discussed, international law proceeds from a presumption of a 
“strong” state, treating states as the key global actors and the primary duty-bearers 
responsible for the realization of human rights within their territories and 
throughout the world.108 This pattern, however, faces two difficulties. 
On the one hand, although states play a significant role in the global arena, 
the role of NSAs in framing global order and influencing the enjoyment of human 
rights worldwide has increased dramatically. NSAs (in particular TNCs and 
international NGOs) and IGOs have come to the fore in shaping today’s global 
agenda, political discourse, rules, institutions, and practices. They are both global 
norm-setters and major violators of human rights, including basic socio-economic 
rights.109 Many of them have capacities superior to those of the average state. For 
example, in 2017, out of the world’s top 100 economies, only thirty-one were 
countries while sixty-nine were TNCs.110 Ten million NGOs worldwide, which 
receive donations from nearly one-third of the Earth’s population and engage a 
                                                 
106  On the necessity of this paradigm shift, see CLAPHAM, supra note 25, at 1; Peters, supra note 28, at 
155. 
107  For critique of state-centrism, see TAN, supra note 28, at 35–39; Lafont, supra note 68, at 198–208; 
LAFONT, supra note 76, at 53–57; Domingo, supra note 76, at 582. 
108  As O’Neill rightly argues, states are considered “primary agents of justice,” while all other entities are 
“secondary agents of justice, whose contribution to justice is regulated, defined and allocated by states.” 
ONORA O’NEILL, JUSTICE ACROSS BOUNDARIES: WHOSE OBLIGATIONS? 160 (2016). See also Lafont, 
supra note 68, at 198–99. 
109  See NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS (Anne Peters et al. eds., 2009). 
110  See 69 of the Richest 100 Entities on the Planet are Corporations, Not Governments, Figures Show, GLOBAL 
JUSTICE NOW (Oct. 17, 2018), http://perma.cc/PV56-G7N7.  
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quarter of them as volunteers, would together form the world’s fifth largest 
economy.111 Decisions of IGOs, especially U.N. agencies and the Bretton Woods 
Institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)), 
substantially influence the political and economic systems of societies all over the 
world.112 These global actors also have a greater capacity to help those in poverty 
than many states.113 Relatedly, the world’s billionaires and other “ultra-high-net 
worth individuals” have substantial opportunities to alleviate poverty 
worldwide.114 Thus, traditional views of the state as the major actor and duty-
bearer do not comport with contemporary global reality. Since human rights are 
legitimate entitlements of individuals against the international community, not 
only states but all global actors should bear obligations proportional to the 
capacities and freedoms they have. 
On the other hand, states may no longer be the “natural problem-solving 
unit[s]” when it comes to the effective exercise of human rights.115 In fact, as 
philosopher Baroness Onora O’Neill correctly notes, they never were. Most states 
are incapable of acting as primary duty-bearers and agents of justice. For example, 
tyrannies and weak states cannot guarantee social justice and human rights 
realization for their citizens and residents, nor can they protect their citizens and 
residents from harms caused by other members of the international community.116 
Home states often themselves participate in (willingly or unwillingly), initiate, and 
involve global actors in human rights abuses.117 While criticizing statist approaches 
to global justice, O’Neill notes that it is naïve to expect that states, as anti-
cosmopolitan institutions, will take leading positions in implementing duties of 
                                                 
111  See 25 Facts and Stats about NGOs Worldwide, http://perma.cc/U6MH-36EN. 
112  See, for example, Tiago Stichelmans, How International Financial Institutions and Donors Influence Economic 
Policies in Developing Countries (Eurodad discussion paper, 2016), http://perma.cc/E5S7-MK2D. 
113  Major foundations and NGOs are capable of providing assistance comparable to that of the biggest 
state donors. If the list of DAC donors included charitable organizations, the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, the world’s biggest charitable organization, would take twelfth place. See Private 
development assistance: key facts and global estimates, DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES (2016), 
http://perma.cc/K4LV-2XLE. 
114  A mere 1% wealth tax imposed on the world’s 2,208 billionaires and 256,000 “ultra-high-net worth 
individuals” would collect, $420 billion per year, approximately 2.5 times more than contemporary 
ODA ($146.6 billion). See JEFFREY D. SACHS ET AL., CLOSING THE SDG BUDGET GAP 26 (2018), 
http://perma.cc/D6UM-9JPY; OECD, Development Aid Stable in 2017 with More Sent to Poorest 
Countries, http://perma.cc/ZC93-GVN6 [hereinafter OECD Development Aid]. 
115  See Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 50, 66 (1997). 
116  O’NEILL, supra note 108, at 164–65. 
117  States often ask for international assistance to finance “monstrous” projects, which abuse human 
rights of the most vulnerable individuals and groups. For example, the World Bank has funded 
projects for the construction of more than 500 dams in 92 countries that caused severe violations 
of human rights and serious environmental damages. See Dams & the World Bank, THE WHIRLED 
BANK GROUP (2003), http://perma.cc/EY7F-WUVM. 
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global justice.118 One can only agree with her thesis that the embodiment of justice 
and the realization of fundamental human rights should not be “endlessly 
postponed until more competent and just states emerge.”119 Therefore, in a rapidly 
changing world, multiple actors other than states (IGOs, NSAs, and individuals) 
should be recognized as agents of global justice and duty-bearers in diagonal 
extraterritorial relations.  
Thus, the recognition of individuals as full-fledged subjects of extraterritorial 
legal relations and the allocation of extraterritorial obligations to multiple global 
actors should enable the “quantum leap” from international justice to global 
justice as well as from a state-centered to a human-centered global order. This 
does not, however, abolish states’ role as “agents” through which individuals may 
claim and enforce their human rights.120 This also does not eliminate states’ 
obligations to influence the conduct of other actors as part of their territorial and 
extraterritorial duties to protect human rights. 
B.  Multiple Duty-Bearers 
As the previous Section demonstrates, global legal relations involve multiple 
actors, all of which should be recognized as agents of justice and bearers of 
extraterritorial obligations. This Section examines normative foundations for 
extraterritorial human rights obligations of major global actors, along with the 
peculiarities of their obligation regimes.  
Global actors may be classified into several main groups: states, IGOs, 
NSAs, and individuals.121 The obligation regimes of these actors differ, though 
they also often overlap.  The content and scope of their obligations depend on 
several factors. First, they depend on the actors’ nature and the purposes of their 
creation (for collective actors). Though all actors possess certain extraterritorial 
obligations corresponding to socio-economic rights, some of them (for instance, 
                                                 
118  O’NEILL, supra note 108, at 160. Some question whether international law itself is part of the 
solution of regulating the behavior of NSAs versus part of the problem. For an analysis, see 
CLAPHAM, supra note 25, at 6. 
119  Cf. “If we take the universalism of obligations as seriously as we have often taken the universalism 
of rights, we need to look realistically at actual agents and agencies, with their actual powers and 
vulnerabilities.” O’NEILL, supra note 108, at 176. 
120  For the role of states as people’s agents in relation to the right to development, see GLOBAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 13, at 116. 
121  Global actors may also be classified into two categories: NSAs, which include a wide range of 
subjects from IGOs to individuals, and states. See, for example, CLAPHAM, supra note 25; NON-STATE 
ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (Math Noortmann et al. eds., 2015); Peters et al., supra note 109, 
at 14. For the purpose of my study, I distinguish IGOs and individuals into separate categories.  
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certain U.N. special agencies,122 foundations, and NGOs) specially aim to provide 
assistance to those in need. Second, obligations are contingent on the role played 
by a particular actor. For example, states’ extraterritorial obligations vary when 
they act directly or through IGOs, or regulate the conduct of NSAs. Third, 
obligation regimes depend on whether global actors are individual or collective 
actors. 
It is necessary to differentiate between two types of collective obligations: 
corporate obligations that fall on the “collective as a whole” (without separating 
the actors that belong to it), and shared obligations where bearers are autonomous 
members of a collective.123 IGOs and NSAs bear corporate obligations. A group 
of independent collaborating actors, such as U.N. member states, are bound by 
shared extraterritorial obligations. 
Several interconnected issues related to multiple actors’ extraterritorial 
obligations are in the spotlight of contemporary discussions. In particular, it is 
widely debated whether IGOs, NSAs, and individuals can be bound by 
extraterritorial human rights obligations corresponding to socio-economic rights, 
especially by global obligations, notwithstanding the fact that only states are 
parties to most human rights treaties.124 It is also debated whether global actors 
should be directly accountable for their failure to implement these obligations or 
whether obligations should run, in the first instance, through states as primary 
duty-bearers. The following two Subsections suggest answers to these questions. 
1. What is the Normative Framework of Global Actors’ 
Extraterritorial Obligations? 
The traditional interpretation of states as the only (or the primary) bearers 
of human rights obligations is inadequate.125 The following analysis turns to the 
normative foundations for human rights obligations of global actors other than 
states. Specifically, it considers: (1) core international human rights instruments; 
(2) customary international law; (3) jus cogens; and (4) self-regulatory soft law 
instruments. 
                                                 
122  For example, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations 
International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and 
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). 
123  On collective obligations see Roland Pierik, Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Normative-
Philosophical Analysis, in DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 43–50 (André 
Nollkaemper & Dov Jacobs eds., 2015). 
124  IGOs may also be parties to legally binding international human rights treaties. For instance, the 
EU is a party to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). 
125  See also CLAPHAM, supra note 25, at 7; Vandenhole, supra note 18, at 1; VANDENBOGAERDE, supra 
note 6, at 6–14; Peters, supra note 28, at 155. 
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First, some core international human rights instruments recognize IGOs, 
NSAs, and individuals as bearers of human rights obligations. For example, the 
UDHR proceeds from the assumption that not just states but “every individual 
and every organ of society” should strive to promote respect for human rights and 
to “secure their universal and effective recognition and observance” through 
progressive national and international measures.126 According to the UDHR, 
“everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible.”127 It also requires states, individuals, 
and groups to refrain from violations of human rights and freedoms set forth in 
the Declaration.128 This requirement is reaffirmed by the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).129 Though the ICESCR and 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) focus on states’ obligations, the 
bodies aimed at monitoring the implementation of these treaties—the Committee 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR)130 and the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child (U.N. CRC)131—clarify that socio-economic rights bind other 
global actors (IGOs, NSAs, and individuals) as well. Relatedly, the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) determines states’ obligations to 
                                                 
126  UDHR, supra note 2, at pmbl. 
127   Id. at art. 29, ¶ 1. 
128  Id.  at art. 30. 
129  ICESCR, supra note 27, at art. 5, ¶ 1. 
130  See Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate 
Food (Art. 11), ¶¶ 36, 38, 40, U.N. Doc E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999) [hereinafter CESCR Gen. 
Comment No. 12]; Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 14: The Right 
to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), ¶¶ 45, 63, U.N Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 
11, 2000) [hereinafter CESCR Gen. Comment No. 14]; Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, 
Gen. Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), ¶ 38, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter CESCR Gen. Comment No. 15]; Comm. on Econ., 
Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the 
Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic 
Production of which He or She Is the Author (Article 15, ¶ 1 (c), of the Covenant), ¶¶ 61, 8240, 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006) [hereinafter CESCR Gen. Comment No. 17]; Comm. 
on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 18: The Right to Work (Art. 6 of the 
Covenant), ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (Feb. 6, 2006) [hereinafter CESCR Gen. Comment 
No. 18]; Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment 19: The Right to Social Security 
(Art. 9), ¶ 61., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/19 (Feb. 4, 2008) [hereinafter CESCR Gen. Comment No. 
19]. See also The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17, Annex (1987) 
[hereinafter Limburg Principles], reprinted in The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 Hum. Rts. Q. 122, 126–27 (1987). 
131  See, for example, Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined third 
to sixth periodic reports of Guinea, ¶¶ 14–15, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GIN/CO/3-6 (2019); Comm. 
on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic 
reports of Japan, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/JPN/CO/4-5 (2019). 
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cooperate with international and regional organizations and civil society.132 The 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action and the Declaration on the Right 
and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and 
Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms also 
bring attention to the importance of international cooperation and obligations of 
individuals, social groups, institutions, and NGOs in promoting the right to a 
social and international order in which human rights are fulfilled.133 
Second, despite the fact that customary international law remains state-
focused, it also provides a legal basis for extraterritorial obligations, including 
global obligations, of multiple actors. Custom is traditionally interpreted through 
two elements: (1) frequent and consistent practice and (2) opinio juris—an 
expressed belief that this practice realizes legal obligations, in particular, in 
international hard and soft law instruments.134 Contemporary opinio juris formed 
by soft law instruments recognizes the human rights obligations of IGOs and 
NSAs. For example, the UDHR, which is generally considered to be an important 
part of customary international law,135 acknowledges global human rights 
obligations of individuals and “organs of society” corresponding to two important 
entitlements: the entitlement to the realization of socio-economic rights 
indispensable for the enjoyment of human dignity universally (Art. 22) and the 
                                                 
132.  G.A. Res. 61/106, Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 32, ¶ 1 (Jan. 24, 2007). 
133  G.A. Res. 48/12, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, art. 13 (Jul. 12, 1993); G.A. Res. 
53/144, Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society 
to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, pmbl., 
art. 18.3 (Dec. 9, 1998), http://perma.cc/TMU3-RAZJ [hereinafter Declaration on the Right and 
Responsibility]. 
134  While traditional approaches to customary international law emphasize the significance of practice, 
modern approaches give precedence to opinio juris. Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern 
Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 757–58 (2001); 
OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, COMMENTARY 
63–64 (2014); SKOGLY, supra note 11, at 109–10. Frederic Kirgis places these two elements at 
different ends of a sliding scale and argues that the more frequent and consistent the practice, the 
less evidence of opinio juris is necessary for the establishment of a custom and vice versa. Frederic L. 
Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 149 (1987). 
135  There is, however, a debate about whether customary international law covers the entire UDHR or 
only its particular norms, especially whether socio-economic rights and corresponding obligations 
are integrated into it. See Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus 
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUST. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 100–02 (1988–89); LOUIS HENKIN, THE 
AGE OF RIGHTS 19 (1990); Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
National and International Law, 3 HEALTH AND HUM. RTS.: AN INT’L J. 144 (1998); Olivier De 
Schutter, The Status of Human Rights in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 39, 41 (Catarina Krause & Martin Scheinin eds., 2009); CLAPHAM, supra note 
25, at 86; SKOGLY, supra note 11, at 110. The Charter of the United Nations (U.N. Charter) and the 
ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Articles) regulating 
states’ extraterritorial obligations are also often acknowledged as part of customary international 
law. 
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entitlement to a just global order in which these rights can be fully realized (Art. 
28).136 
In addition, the Millennium Development Goals (particularly Goal 8, which 
demands the “develop[ment of] a global partnership for development”) and the 
Sustainable Development Goals (especially Goal 17, which requires the 
“strengthen[ing of] the means of implementation and revitaliz[ation of] the global 
partnership for sustainable development”) reinforce the intention of states and 
other members of the global community to cooperate for the realization of 
essential social and economic interests of individuals. In particular, they emphasize 
the global commitments of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, guaranteeing 
secure access to food, water, sanitation, health care, and basic education for all, 
which are also objects of basic socio-economic rights.137 
At the same time, there is no consensus on the status of global obligations. 
Despite the fact that members of the international community have repeatedly 
demonstrated their intention to contribute to global poverty eradication within 
the framework of both human rights and development agendas, developed states, 
IGOs, and NSAs have unambiguously expressed reluctance to bind themselves 
with legal instruments regulating global obligations, especially obligations to assist 
in the realization of socio-economic rights.138 Therefore, according to 
contemporary opinio juris, global obligations represent voluntary commitments 
rather than human rights-based obligations. The same trend can be found in the 
practice of the implementation of global obligations by various actors.139 This 
implies an intermediate conclusion that global obligations form a part of 
customary international law only as voluntary self-obligations of various global 
actors rather than human rights obligations.140 
Third, jus cogens, the preemptory norms of international law overriding all 
other legal sources, are not only binding on states, but also on IGOs, NSAs, and 
individuals. Jus cogens embrace fundamental, or core, human rights that are 
                                                 
136  See Section IV.B below. 
137  See Philip Alston, A Human Rights Perspective on the Millennium Development Goals, Paper prepared as a 
contribution to the work of the Millennium Project Task Force on Poverty and Economic 
Development, ¶¶ 41–42, 48; Gobind Nankani et al., Human Rights and Poverty Reduction Strategies: 
Moving Towards Convergence? in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL 
REINFORCEMENT 475 (Philip Alston & Mary Robinson eds., 2005); CLAPHAM, supra note 25, at 86–
87. 
138  Alston, supra note 137, at ¶ 42. 
139  On the practice of the realization of international obligations to assist, see Pribytkova, supra note 
78, at 300–330. 
140  See Philip Alston, Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and Development Debate 
Seen through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 755, 778 (2005); Alston, 
supra note 137, at ¶¶ 42, 48. 
What Global Human Rights Obligations Do We Have? Pribytkova 
Winter 2020 417 
addressed to all global actors.141 Although there have been doubts in literature 
about the potential of socio-economic rights to become a part of jus cogens,142 
several scholars maintain that, as a necessary condition for the realization of jus 
cogens human rights (for example, the right to life), basic socio-economic rights, 
and corresponding obligations, should receive the status of jus cogens norms.143 
Fourth, an increasing number of global actors take on extraterritorial 
obligations by joining or adopting self-regulatory soft law instruments. Prominent 
examples of such self-regulatory instruments are international framework 
agreements and corporate codes of conduct.144 
Based on this brief analysis of the normative foundations for human rights 
obligations of global actors, it is clear that contemporary international human 
rights law recognizes that human rights give rise to corresponding obligations not 
only of states, but also of other global actors. This concerns negative obligations 
to respect human rights, whereas positive global obligations to protect and fulfill 
socio-economic rights are interpreted as self-commitments of members of the 
international community. 
2. How are Extraterritorial Obligations of Various Actors Regulated? 
This Subsection briefly outlines the current legal regime regulating 
extraterritorial human rights obligations of states, IGOs, NSAs, and individuals, 
while also pointing out existing gaps in this regime. It does not attempt, however, 
to propose principles for attributing particular global obligations to these different 
categories of entities. That is a research agenda that requires further careful 
attention beyond the scope of this Article. 
First, states. As key agents in the international arena, states play several roles 
and are bound by three types of extraterritorial obligations: (1) direct 
extraterritorial obligations; (2) obligations as members of IGOs; and (3) 
obligations to regulate and influence the conduct of NSAs and individuals. 
(1) Recognizing direct extraterritorial obligations of states requires rethinking the 
concept of jurisdiction, which signifies a certain normative relationship between 
                                                 
141  See International Law Commission, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, art. 50, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l (1966). 
142  See, for example, Predrag Zenović, RGSL Research Papers, No. 6: Human Rights Enforcement via Peremptory 
Norms – a Challenge to State Sovereignty 36–37 (2012). 
143  See, for example, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 36 (Francisco 
Forrest Martin et al. eds., 2006). 
144  See, for example, Lisa R. Price, International Framework Agreement: A Collaborative Paradigm for Labor 
Relations, in OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 241 
(2006); Fiona McLeay, Corporate Codes of Conduct and the Human Rights Accountability of Transnational 
Corporations: A Small Piece of a Larger Puzzle, in OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 219 (2006). 
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states and individuals.145 International public law proceeds from a presumption, 
particularly expressed in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that 
international treaties are binding upon state parties within their territory.146 There 
are no jurisdictional restrictions in the ICESCR that explicitly recognizes that 
states have extraterritorial obligations corresponding to socio-economic rights 
while mentioning their obligations of international assistance and cooperation.147 
However, the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, which allows the bringing of 
individual complaints to the consideration of the CESCR, uses the criterion of 
jurisdiction.148 According to the case law of U.N. treaty bodies, states’ jurisdiction 
extends to situations when they exercise effective territorial and personal control, 
as well as when there is a causal link between their activity and human rights 
impacts.149 Article 2 of the ICESCR also implies that states’ jurisdiction embraces 
situations where they act for the realization of socio-economic rights universally.150 
Though a binding human rights instrument regulating states’ extraterritorial 
obligations is still lacking, the Maastricht Principles and accompanying 
commentaries provide a systematic explication of states’ extraterritorial 
obligations in the area of socio-economic rights.151 
                                                 
145  It is customary to classify several dimensions of jurisdiction: subject-matter jurisdiction; territorial 
jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction; and temporal jurisdiction. 
146  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 29, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
147  ICESCR, supra note 27, at art. 2. 
148  G.A. Res. 63/117, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, art. 2 (Mar. 5, 2009). 
149  In concluding observations on Israel, the CESCR asserted that jurisdiction includes all territories 
and populations under states’ effective control. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Report 
on the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Sessions, ¶ 234, U.N. Doc. E/1999/22, E/C.12/1998/26 
(1999). According to the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), which considers individual 
complaints for violations of human rights recognized in the ICCPR, jurisdiction concerns the links 
between individuals and states relating to human rights violations. See HRC, Delia Saldias de Lopez 
v. Uruguay, Communication App. No. 52/1979, ¶ 12.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1984). See also 
HRC, Gen. Comment No. 36, on the Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, on the Right to Life, ¶¶ 26, 66, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (2018). The European Court 
of Human Rights came to the same conclusion about states’ jurisdiction. See, for example, Al-Jedda 
v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08; Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and 
Russia, App. No. 43370/04; Chiragov and Others v. Armenia, App. No. 13216/05. 
150  U.N. treaty-based bodies, the CESCR, the U.N. CRC, and the CEDAW demand that states do not 
violate socio-economic rights abroad as well as implement their global obligations. See, for example, 
Comm. on. Soc. and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of 
Germany, ¶¶ 8–9, 12–15, 20–21, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/DEU/CO/6 (2018); Comm. on the Rights of 
the Child, Combined fourth and fifth reports submitted to the CRC by Singapore under article 44 
of the Convention, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SGP/4-5 (2017); Comm. on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, Concluding observations on the ninth periodic report of Norway, 
¶ 14–15, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/NOR/CO/9 (2017). 
151  For an analysis of lacunas in the Maastricht Principles, see Section IV.A. 
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(2) States also bear extraterritorial obligations as members of IGOs. In several 
General Comments, the CESCR notes that states “have an obligation to ensure 
that their actions as members of intergovernmental organizations, including 
international financial institutions, take due account” of basic socio-economic 
rights.152 The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights specify that states are responsible for “violations resulting from 
the programmes and policies of the organizations of which they are members.”153 
Since there are currently no mechanisms for holding IGOs directly accountable 
for their violations of socio-economic rights, researchers and practitioners 
propose bringing to account states that play key roles in the decision-making of 
these organizations.154 This Article advocates the recognition of IGOs’ direct 
accountability. 
(3) In the contemporary state-centered international order, states are 
expected to regulate and influence the conduct of NSAs and individuals.155 The CESCR 
and the U.N. CRC, however, require states to regulate NSAs primarily as part of 
                                                 
152  See Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 13: The Right to Education 
(Art. 13), ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (Dec. 8, 1999) [hereinafter CESCR Gen. Comment 
No. 13]; CESCR Gen. Comments No. 12, 14, and 18, supra note 130. Cf. the ETO Consortium, 
supra note 7 (principle 15 of the Maastricht Principles) (“As a member of an international 
organization, the State remains responsible for its own conduct in relation to its human rights 
obligations within its territory and extraterritorially. A State that transfers competences to, or 
participates in, an international organization must take all reasonable steps to ensure that the 
relevant organization acts consistently with the international human rights obligations of that 
State.”). The CESCR also requires states to report on how their participation in the decision-making 
and norm-setting of IGOs affects the enjoyment of socio-economic rights world-wide. See 
Guidelines on treaty-specific documents to be submitted by states parties under articles 16 and 17 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 3(c), E/C.12/2008/224 
(Mar. 2009). 
153  Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 691, 
698 (1998). 
154  See, for example, FONS COOMANS & ROLF KÜNNEMANN, CASES AND CONCEPTS ON 
EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
52–61 (2012). 
155  See International Law Commission, ILC Articles, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002) (the ILC 
Articles); ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principle 26 of the Maastricht Principles); U.N. Guiding 
Principles, supra note 16; Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 24 on 
State obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the 
context of business activities, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/24 (Aug. 10, 2017) [hereinafter CESCR Gen. 
Comment No. 24]. States’ obligations to regulate and influence the conduct of NSAs and 
individuals should not be confused with states’ responsibility for the conduct of NSAs and 
individuals in cases when the latter are directed and controlled by the state. International Law 
Commission, supra note 141, at art. 8. Cf. ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principle 12 of the 
Maastricht Principles). 
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their territorial, rather than extraterritorial, obligations.156 These requirements 
often exceed the ability of developing countries to control more powerful NSAs, 
especially TNCs, affiliated with developed states. Commentators draw attention 
to the fact that the CESCR’s emphasis on obligations of home states to protect 
their citizens from the negative impact of global actors157 does not promote the 
acceptance of these actors’ direct obligations, nor does it promote obligations of 
the states with which they are affiliated.158 U.N. treaty bodies have only recently 
begun requiring states to govern the extraterritorial conduct of TNCs registered 
or domiciled in their territory.159  
Second, intergovernmental organizations, which consist of member states, 
represent organizations “established by a treaty or other instrument governed by 
international law and possessing [their] own international legal personalit[ies].”160 
IGOs, especially financial institutions, command great resources and power 
without adequate accountability.161 Presently, there are neither binding legal 
instruments regulating direct human rights obligations of IGOs162 nor 
international bodies with jurisdiction to hold IGOs directly accountable for their 
failure to implement their human rights obligations. Additionally, IGOs usually 
enjoy immunity from the jurisdiction of domestic accountability mechanisms.163 
                                                 
156  See, for example, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on the Fifth 
Periodic report of Columbia, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/COL/CO/5 (2010); Comm. Rights Child, 
Concluding observations on the Third and Fourth Periodic report of Sri Lanka, ¶¶ 18–19, U.N. 
Doc. CRC/C/LKA/CO/3-4 (2010). 
157  See, for example, CESCR Concluding observations on Congo, supra note 102, at ¶ 3; Comm. on the 
Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the Second Periodic report of Cuba, ¶ 21, U.N. 
Doc. CRC/C/CUB/CO.2 (2011). 
158  VANDENBOGAERDE, supra note 6, at 78. 
159  See, for example, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on the fourth 
periodic report of New Zealand, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/NZL/CO/4 (2018); Comm. on 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding observations on the combined eighth 
and ninth periodic reports of Canada, ¶¶ 18–19, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CAN/8-9 (2016).  
160  Draft Articles on International Organizations, supra note 16, art. 2(a). 
161  See, for example, Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human 
rights, the World Bank and human rights, ¶ 65, U.N. Doc. A/70/274 (2015) [hereinafter The World 
Bank and Human Rights]; Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and 
human rights, the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in relation to social protection, 
¶ 58, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/33 (2018) [hereinafter The Role of the IMF]. 
162  The Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations deal with international 
organizations’ breaches of international obligations determined as acts which are “not in conformity 
with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of the origin or character of the obligation 
concerned” (art. 10), that is, this includes violations of global human rights obligations. Draft 
Articles on International Organizations, supra note 16. 
163  For discussion of the U.N. immunity, see Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
extreme poverty and human rights, U.N. responsibility for the introduction of cholera into Haiti, 
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The CESCR requires states to implement human rights in cases of their 
membership in or cooperation with IGOs. It focuses, therefore, on territorial and 
extraterritorial obligations of states, without due regard to direct obligations of 
IGOs themselves.164 The recognition of the responsibility of participating states 
for actions or omissions of IGOs is insufficient, especially when states have 
limited control over IGOs’ activities.165 
According to the traditional view, IGOs are only bound by duties to respect 
human rights, with some limited obligations to protect them, whereas the duty to 
fulfill human rights is beyond their concern. The Tilburg Guiding Principles on 
the World Bank, IMF and Human Rights,166 as well as some researchers and 
practitioners,167 voice this view about the Bretton Woods Institutions. Conversely, 
the Maastricht Principles, which are, by their terms, applicable to IGOs, provide 
that IGOs are bound by extraterritorial obligations, including global obligations 
to respect, protect, and fulfill socio-economic rights.168 
Third, non-state actors are collective entities that are not states, do not consist 
of states, and are not directed or funded by states.169 They include, but are not 
limited to, TNCs, NGOs, religious groups, media organizations, as well as 
paramilitary and armed resistance groups. This Subsection considers TNCs in 
particular, as they are major global actors and frequent violators of human rights 
worldwide. They form a salient example for framing the broader question of 
whether NSAs should be recognized as bearers of global human rights obligations. 
TNCs’ extraterritorial obligations are regulated by soft law instruments.170 A 
                                                 
U.N. Doc. A/71/367 (2016); José Enrique Alvarez, The U.N. in the Time of Cholera, 108 AM. J. INT’L 
L. UNBOUND 22, 24–25 (2014–15). 
164  See, for example, CESCR Gen. Comments No. 12, 14, 18, supra note 130; CESCR Gen. Comment 
No. 13, supra note 152. 
165  See VANDENBOGAERDE, supra note 6, at 72. 
166  “As international legal persons, the World Bank and the IMF have international legal obligations to 
take full responsibility for human rights respect in situations where the institutions’ own projects, 
policies or programmes negatively impact or undermine the enjoyment of human rights.” Tilburg 
Guiding Principles, supra note 16, at 250.  
167  See SKOGLY, supra note 8. Mac Darrow asserts that obligations of the World Bank and the IMF to 
fulfill may also arise, especially in the context of cooperation with human rights organs, though he 
does not specify them. MAC DARROW, BETWEEN LIGHT AND SHADOW: THE WORLD BANK, THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 131–33 (2003). 
168  ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principle 16 of the Maastricht Principles). 
169  For definition, see, for example, CLAPHAM, supra note 25, at 25; Peters et al., supra note 109, at 14. 
170  See, for example, U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 16; U.N. Subcomm. on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, art. 1, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Norms]; U.N. Global Compact, 
http://perma.cc/5GYN-SS8G; OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2001); 
International Organization for Standardization, ISO 26000 Social Responsibility (2010), 
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special U.N. Human Rights Council open-ended intergovernmental working 
group has been mandated to elaborate a Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, 
in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises (Legally Binding Instrument).171 One of the most 
debated questions in this context is whether extraterritorial obligations of TNCs 
extend beyond obligations to respect.172 
Two significant international instruments provide distinct answers to this 
question. The U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (U.N. 
Guiding Principles) limit extraterritorial obligations of TNCs to the obligation to 
respect,173 while the obligation to regulate and influence their activity falls on the 
state.174 This minimalistic interpretation of TNCs’ direct obligations has been 
criticized by experts.175 Though the U.N. Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights (U.N. Norms) also reaffirm the primary obligations of states, they 
recognize that “within their respective spheres of activity and influence, 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises have the obligation to 
promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized 
in international as well as national law, including the rights and interests of 
indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups.”176 The U.N. Norms 
acknowledge that TNCs, “as organs of society,” are responsible for “promoting 
                                                 
http://perma.cc/E83C-NT3E; International Labour Organization, Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (2017). 
171  See Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, 
http://perma.cc/N6DJ-XBVG. 
172  See, for example, Alston & Robinson, supra note 137; David Bilchitz, Do Corporations Have Positive 
Fundamental Rights Obligations?, 57 THEORIA 1 (2010); HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: 
BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT? (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2013) 
[hereinafter OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS]; BUILDING A TREATY ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
CONTEXT AND CONTOURS (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2017) [hereinafter BUILDING A 
TREATY]. 
173  U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 16, at 13 (principle 11). At the same time, in the U.N. Guiding 
Principles, the obligation to respect is specified not only as avoiding causing human rights violations 
or contributing to them through transnational corporation’s own activities, but also as preventing 
or mitigating violations “directly linked to their operations, products or services by their business 
relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts.” Id. at 14–15 (principle 13). 
174   Id. at 3–12 (principles 1–10). 
175  See, for example, OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS, supra note 172; BUILDING A TREATY, supra note 172; 
FLORIAN WETTSTEIN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS OF A QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTION (2009) [hereinafter MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS]; Florian Wettstein, CSR and the Debate on Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Great 
Divide, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 739 (2012) [hereinafter CSR]. 
176  U.N. Norms, supra note 170, at art. 1 (emphasis added). For a comparative analysis of the U.N. 
Norms and the U.N. Guiding Principles, see Vandenhole, supra note 6. 
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and securing” human rights.177 In addition, some U.N. treaty bodies go beyond 
the U.N. Guiding Principles, concluding that TNCs have a duty to protect human 
rights.178 
Though the U.N. Norms did not receive wide acceptance, the idea that 
TNCs, as social entities or “organs of society,” should perform societal goals and, 
therefore, contribute to the realization of shared global obligations corresponding 
to socio-economic rights, is being developed by researchers and practitioners.179 
This reasoning is supported by empirical evidence that TNCs have immense 
resources and, consequently, the potential to promote global poverty eradication. 
Since a revised draft of the Legally Binding Instrument presupposes that 
business enterprises possess only obligations to respect human rights,180 the legal 
recognition of TNCs’ positive obligations to contribute to the protection and 
fulfillment of socio-economic rights is a task for the future development of human 
rights law. 
Fourth, individuals. Human rights-based cosmopolitanism builds on the 
foundation that individuals should play the key role in the global domain as both 
rights-holders and duty-bearers. In accordance with the UDHR, which recognizes 
the human rights obligations of individuals, the Declaration on the Right to 
Development (DRD) reaffirms that “the human person is the central subject of 
the development process and that development policy should therefore make the 
human being the main participant and beneficiary of development.”181 
Individuals act in several roles and participate in several types of relations: in 
horizontal relations with their compatriots as right-holders and duty-bearers and 
with global actors as bearers of shared extraterritorial obligations; in vertical 
relations with their state as right-holders; and in diagonal relations with global 
actors as right-holders. There are two major “channels” for individuals to realize 
                                                 
177  U.N. Norms, supra note 170, at pmbl., arts. 13–14. 
178  See Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic report of 
Ecuador, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/ECU/431 (2010); Comm. on the Rights of the Child, 
Concluding observations on the Third and Fourth Periodic report of Sri Lanka, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/LKA/CO/3-4 (2010). 
179  For example, David Bilchitz justifies positive obligations of corporations as both remedial 
responsibilities and global obligations to assist. Bilchitz, supra note 172. See also Vandenhole, supra 
note 6; MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 175; CSR, supra note 175; OBLIGATIONS OF 
BUSINESS, supra note 172; BUILDING A TREATY, supra note 172. 
180  U.N. OHCHR, Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the 
Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (July 16, 2019), 
http://perma.cc/B5XP-FXCH. 
181  G.A. Res. 41/128, Declaration on Right to Development, pmbl. (Dec. 4, 1986). The DRD 
continues that “every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and 
enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized. Id. at art. 1. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 424 Vol. 20 No. 2 
their human rights and obligations, namely, their state and (organizations of) 
global civil society. 
Within this analysis, how should we understand the place of the global 
community as a collective subject of obligations? Two main entities interact within 
the global community: the international community of states, which includes 
states and IGOs, and the global civil society, which embraces NSAs and 
individuals. The creation of an international community of states is one of the 
main objectives of the Charter of the United Nations (U.N. Charter). International 
lawyer Andrew Clapham compares the growth of global civil society with 
“bottom-up” globalization, which is a response to “top-down” globalization.182 
He also shows that globalization has substantially limited states’ capacities to 
respond to new world challenges. Since individuals are not able to count on the 
protection and assistance of their governments, they are forced to mobilize for 
common action in order to protect themselves against foreign states and NSAs 
and to exercise their human rights.183 In this sense, global civil society is both a 
very powerful actor that is in horizontal legal relations to other global actors and 
an important medium through which fundamental interests and human rights of 
individuals are presented and defended and through which shared extraterritorial 
obligations of individuals may be implemented. 
Based on the preceding analysis, this Article concludes that all global 
actors—states, IGOs, NSAs, and individuals—should be recognized as primary 
agents of global justice and duty-bearers of shared extraterritorial obligations, 
including global obligations. Would this necessarily entail the decline of the state? 
The recognition of the agency and shared obligations of other global actors would 
change the alignment of forces in the global arena and abolish the state’s 
monopoly as the primary agent of justice. This transition from a state-centered to 
a human-centered world order would not, however, displace the weighty role of 
the state. Instead, the state would be transformed into a kind of human rights-
based political union. Indeed, the proposed regime would strengthen the role of 
the state, to the extent that it expands the state’s human rights obligations beyond 
its territory and enhances the state’s accountability for violations of extraterritorial 
obligations. 
C. Two Types of Extraterritorial  Obligations  
This Section intends to differentiate the main types of extraterritorial 
obligations. Legal and political philosophy and human rights law use a variety of 
normative bases for attributing extraterritorial obligations to various actors. 
                                                 
182  CLAPHAM, supra note 25, at 7. 
183  Id. 
What Global Human Rights Obligations Do We Have? Pribytkova 
Winter 2020 425 
Political philosophers David Miller and Charles Beitz argue that, although each 
principle for allocating human rights obligations may seem quite plausible by itself, 
none can adequately embrace all types of transnational obligations of all global 
actors.184 Thus, “a multi-principle theory” that harmonizes different normative 
bases should be formulated, and an order for applying these bases should be 
defined.185 Following this advice, this Section considers major grounds for 
extraterritorial human rights obligations and determines their interrelation and 
hierarchy. 
The primary criterion applied for distinguishing between various types of 
extraterritorial obligations in legal literature and practice is the possibility of 
establishing a causal link between acts/omissions of various actors and human 
rights abuses.186 On this basis, the Maastricht Principles classify two main types of 
extraterritorial obligations: (1) “obligations relating to the acts and omissions of a 
State” affecting the enjoyment of human rights abroad; and (2) “obligations of a 
global character that are set out in the Charter of the United Nations and human 
rights instruments to take action, separately, and jointly through international 
cooperation, to realize human rights universally.”187 The obligations of the first 
type are remedial responsibilities for a negative effect on the enjoyment of socio-
economic rights worldwide. A serious socio-economic deprivation of individuals 
having no secure access to basic rights (when the harm cannot be attributed to 
any particular actors or institutions) gives rise to extraterritorial obligations of the 
second type—in other words, to global human rights obligations. Thus, the 
Maastricht Principles combine various normative bases for attributing 
extraterritorial obligations into two large categories—those relating to (1) cases 
where causal links between acts/omissions of actors and human rights abuses can 
be established (for example, historical injustice, caused harm, domination, 
effective control, exploitation, misuse of shared natural resources); and (2) cases 
where such links cannot be found (for example, solidarity, capacity to assist, and 
ability to reform the international order)—without specifying the difference 
between various normative bases within each of these categories. This Section 
continues with an analysis of these two types of obligations. 
                                                 
184  See David Miller, Distributing Responsibilities, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 453, 464 (2001); CHARLES R. BEITZ, THE 
IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 170–71 (2009). 
185  Though Miller focuses on remedial transnational responsibilities, his conception may be used for 
attributing extraterritorial obligations of a non-remedial kind as well. He formulates a multi-
principle conception that combines four principles—causal responsibility, moral responsibility, 
capacity, and community—of allocating remedial responsibilities. See Miller, supra note 184, at 464. 
186  It is “legal” but not “factual” or “moral” causality that is relevant in this context. See Tony Honoré, 
Causation in the Law, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Zalta et al. eds., 2010).  
187  ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principle 8 of the Maastricht Principles). 
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According to Miller’s important observation, the justificatory bases 
underlying these two major types of extraterritorial obligations—which he terms 
“backward-looking” and “forward-looking” theories188—concentrate on different 
subjects: the human rights violators and the victims, respectively. Relatedly, they 
concern two different questions: “Who is responsible for a human right abuse?” 
and “Who is in a better position to assist the victims of human right violations?”189 
Miller rightly argues that none of these theories is persuasive or sufficient in 
isolation. While assigning obligations to particular perpetrators, “backward-
looking” theories do not necessarily guarantee that victims will receive an adequate 
remedy and compensation when perpetrators are incapable of providing them, 
especially when urgent measures are required. Perpetrators are not always the best 
problem-solvers. Though “backward-looking” theories claim that an unjust global 
institutional structure should be changed,190 they lack reasons for demanding the 
creation of a new regulatory and institutional framework necessary for the 
realization of the human right to a just global order. At the same time, a weakness 
of the “forward-looking” account concerns its ignorance regarding how actors 
responsible for human rights violations should be held accountable. It is both 
important to protect victims and improve the global institutional order, as well as 
to hold perpetrators accountable for their violations of basic socio-economic 
rights and prevent future abuses. On this premise, a balance between the 
“backward-looking” and “forward-looking” approaches should be sought, and the 
right sequence in the application of remedial and global obligations should be 
determined.191  
Remedial extraterritorial obligations and global obligations are simultaneous 
obligations that frequently overlap.192 The simultaneity of these obligations means 
that they cannot be mutually discharged. Compensation for harm caused does not 
relieve actors of their global obligations to realize basic socio-economic rights 
universally. In the same vein, implementing global obligations (for example, 
                                                 
188  Miller, supra note 184, at 465–66. Different terminology is used in literature to describe these 
conceptions: “deontological” and “consequentialist” (Roland Pierik); primary and secondary 
(Stefan Gosepath); retrospective compensatory and perspective distributive (Onora O’Neill); 
contribution-based and assistance-based (Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland). Roland Pierik, 
supra note 121, at 56; O’Neill supra note 123; Stefan Gosepath, Deprivation and Institutionally Based 
Duties to Aid, in DOMINATION AND GLOBAL POLITICAL JUSTICE. CONCEPTUAL, HISTORICAL, AND 
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES 257 (Barbara Buckinx et al. eds., 2015). 
189  Miller reduces global obligations to obligations of assistance, while this Article demonstrates that 
the area of global obligations is much wider. See Miller, supra note 184. 
190  See, for example, WORLD POVERTY, supra note 43, at 118–22. 
191  Miller himself is rather a supporter of the priority of a “forward-looking” theory over the 
“backward-looking.” Miller, supra note 184, at 461. 
192  See De Schutter et al., supra note 15, at 1101. 
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assisting the poor or undertaking human rights impact assessments (HRIAs)) does 
not exempt actors from their remedial responsibility for the extraterritorial human 
rights violations they have caused. 
At the same time, remedial responsibilities should not be replaced by global 
obligations. For example, the realization of remedial responsibilities to 
compensate for harm should precede the implementation of global obligations to 
assist.193 Human rights organizations and activists have documented many cases 
in which global players have not recognized their responsibility for extraterritorial 
violations of human rights and cannot be held legally accountable in the absence 
of appropriate mechanisms.194 Meanwhile, these players trumpet their voluntary 
“assistance” to the global poor, which is very modest compared to the harm they 
have caused. Injustice, immorality, and negative consequences of these practices 
for the global poor have been convincingly demonstrated by a wide range of 
experts.195 Compensation to victims for harm should not be given under the guise 
of “help.”196 Victims have the right to the truth about human rights violations that 
should also be guaranteed in the extraterritorial context.197  
Extraterritorial obligations of one type may arise from the non-fulfillment 
of the obligation of the other type. For example, a refusal by the responsible actors 
to compensate for harm caused may be a basis for other actors’ obligation to act 
for the realization of the rights of the affected individuals (to protect them or 
provide assistance). A failure to fulfill global obligations, in turn, may be a basis 
for an obligation to compensate the injured individuals and/or other actors who 
have provided assistance to the victims. 
                                                 
193  In certain cases (when urgent help to the victims is necessary; or the responsible actors are unable 
to provide compensation; or if the compensation is not provided in full and is insufficient to 
guarantee the minimum socio-economic conditions of a decent life), remedial responsibilities of the 
actors involved in extraterritorial human rights violations to compensate victims for the harm 
caused by them may initially be performed by third parties in the form of global assistance, with the 
consequent reimbursement of the costs of the provided assistance. See Pribytkova, supra note 78, at 
262. 
194  For examples of these practices, see COOMANS & KÜNNEMANN, supra note 154. 
195  See, for example, Thomas W. Pogge, “Assisting” the Global Poor, 13 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
TWENTY-FIRST WORLD CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY 189 (2007). 
196  In case of human rights violation, harmful activities must be immediately stopped. See ETO 
Consortium, supra note 7 (principles 13 & 14 of the Maastricht Principles); Olivier De Schutter, Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Guiding principles on Human Rights Impact 
Assessments of Trade and Investment Agreements, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/59/Add.5 (2001). 
197  ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principle 38 of the Maastricht Principles). 
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D.  Obligations to Respect,  Protect , and Fulfil l  Socio-Economic 
Rights Universally  
Contemporary legal philosophy and international human rights law apply a 
tripartite theory of human rights obligations that distinguishes between 
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill. This Section will discuss which of these 
obligations are owed by various actors. 
The tripartite theory of human rights obligations successfully overcomes the 
classic dichotomy of positive and negative duties, while demonstrating that each 
human right gives rise to both negative and positive obligations. For example, 
Shue made a significant contribution to the development of the tripartite theory 
by demonstrating that there are three kinds of duties corresponding to every 
human right, including socio-economic rights: duties to avoid depriving, to 
protect from deprivation, and to aid the deprived.198 Following the tripartite 
theory, the CESCR distinguishes between obligations to respect, protect, and 
fulfill (facilitate, provide, and promote) corresponding to socio-economic rights.199 
It is disputed whether all global actors can be bearers of all three types of 
duties. Current commentary and practice are highly skeptical about extending the 
responsibility regimes of IGOs, NSAs, and individuals beyond obligations to 
respect.200 This Article defends the position that all actors should possess certain 
global obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill socio-economic rights. 
First, all global actors should respect socio-economic rights. In other words, 
they should avoid causing harm or creating “a real risk of nullifying or impairing 
the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially.”201 The 
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Prevention of 
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, the CESCR’s Comments, and 
the Maastricht Principles provide that states and other actors should cooperate in 
order to implement their general obligations to respect socio-economic rights 
internationally.202 The duty to avoid causing harm is a legal basis for the obligations 
                                                 
198  See SHUE, supra note 43, at 60. 
199  On the evolution of the tripartite theory, see MAGDALENA SEPÚLVEDA, THE NATURE OF THE 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
RIGHTS 157 (2003). On the application of the theory to obligations of international assistance and 
cooperation, see Sepúlveda, supra note 11. 
200 From Shue’s point of view, various actors are bound by different combinations of obligations 
corresponding to basic socio-economic rights: while duties to avoid depriving bind all actors 
(individuals and social institutions), duties to protect and to aid should only be implemented by 
special social institutions. See SHUE, supra note 43, at 60. 
201  See ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principle 13 of the Maastricht Principles). 
202  See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities, art. 4 (2001); CESCR Gen. Comment No. 14, supra note 130, at ¶ 39; CESCR Gen. 
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to undertake ex ante HRIAs and human rights due diligence (HRDD) as tools of 
identifying and measuring potential effects of multiple actors’ acts/omissions on 
the enjoyment of socio-economic rights.203 Both (potential) victims and citizens 
of a home state have the right to demand that HRIAs and HRDD be conducted 
and to participate in them.204 
Second, the CESCR recognizes states’ obligations to protect socio-economic 
rights abroad.205 According to the Maastricht Principles, states have separate and 
joint obligations to regulate and influence the conduct of individuals and NSAs—
including TNCs—in order to prevent their abuses of human rights 
extraterritorially. The obligations to protect also include measures to hold 
violators accountable, and to ensure an effective remedy for victims.206 As Shue 
suggests, duties to protect comprise interactional obligations to enforce duties to 
respect, as well as institutional obligations to create and maintain efficient national 
and international mechanisms (including accountability bodies) necessary for the 
realization of obligations to protect.207 Not just states, but also IGOs and NSAs 
should take an active role in implementing obligations to protect,208 in particular 
creating non-judicial mechanisms as well as conducting ex post HRIAs.209 
Third, global obligations to fulfill socio-economic rights combine obligations to 
facilitate, provide, and promote.210 Extraterritorial obligations to facilitate require 
creating and maintaining a global institutional scheme enabling individuals to 
enjoy their basic socio-economic rights worldwide. Extraterritorial obligations to 
                                                 
Comment No. 15, supra note 130, at ¶ 31; CESCR Gen. Comment No. 19, supra note 130, at  ¶ 53; 
ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principle 19 of the Maastricht Principles). 
203  See ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principle 14 of the Maastricht Principles); U.N. Guiding 
Principles, supra note 16, at 15–23 (principles 15, 17-21). 
204  See Alexandra Eberhard et al., Human Rights Impact Assessments: Human Rights Clinic Report (2015), 
http://perma.cc/R862-RWWH. 
205  See CESCR Gen. Comment No. 14, supra note 130, at ¶ 39; CESCR Gen. Comment No. 15, supra 
note 130, at ¶ 33 (2003); CESCR Gen. Comment No. 19, supra note 130, at ¶ 54 (2008). 
206  See ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principles 23–27 of the Maastricht Principles). 
207  See SHUE, supra note 43, at 62; see also Alston, supra note 137, at ¶ 6.4. 
208  Cf. regulation of IGOs’ obligations to protect through the Maastricht Principles (principle 16) and 
TNCs’ obligations to protect through the U.N. Norms (art. 1) (Section III.B(2) above). 
209  For example, grievance mechanisms created by the World Bank (Inspection Panel), the UNDP and 
the UNEP (Stakeholder Response Mechanisms). National Contact Points established in accordance 
with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises represent important non-judicial 
complaint procedures for individuals and communities whose human rights are violated by TNCs. 
See The World Bank, How to File a Complaint (Request for Inspection), http://perma.cc/NJ3J-MKP7; 
UNDP, Stakeholder Response Mechanism, http://perma.cc/Q3ZF-8D76; UNEP, UNEP’s 
environmental, social and economic sustainability: Stakeholder response mechanism, http://perma.cc/KSW3-
G9F7; OECD Watch, National Contact Points (NCPs), http://perma.cc/ETL7-75TD. 
210  See SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 199, at 239. 
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promote involve ensuring access to educational programs, knowledge, and 
information about socio-economic rights globally, and encouraging governments 
to guarantee this access at the national level. Global obligations to provide 
presuppose guaranteeing access to resources and services indispensable for 
leading a decent life to those who are unable to secure this access by themselves. 
The core international human rights instruments recognize states’ global 
obligations to fulfill.211 This Article argues that the shared obligations to facilitate, 
promote, and provide bind not only states, but all members of the international 
community. As demonstrated in Section III.B, global obligations to fulfill have 
not yet received international legal recognition. However, there have been 
attempts to regulate various global actors’ obligations to fulfill through some soft 
law instruments. For example, according to the Maastricht Principles, states and 
IGOs are bound by global obligations to fulfill socio-economic rights.212 
Additionally, the U.N. Norms presuppose TNCs’ obligations to promote and 
“secure the fulfilment of” human rights “within their respective spheres of activity 
and influence.”213 Although the U.N. Norms have not been accepted 
internationally, they exercise influence over the theory and practice of human 
rights.214 
Many scholars and practitioners consider obligations to respect and protect 
socio-economic rights territorially and extraterritorially to be similar and 
simultaneous obligations.215 At the same time, they point out that extraterritorial 
obligations to fulfill differ from territorial obligations because (1) they are 
complementary (or subsidiary) in respect to territorial obligations, and (2) they 
only bind those actors that are “in a position to assist.”216 This view rests on the 
                                                 
211  See UDHR, supra note 2, at arts. 22, 28. ICESCR, supra note 27, at arts. 2, 11. The CESCR 
acknowledges that global obligations of cooperation and assistance in the realization of socio-
economic rights, in particular related to key components of the right to an adequate standard of 
living—the rights to adequate food, water, sanitation, housing, and health —are legal obligations of 
states (see Section IV.D below).  
212  ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principles 16, 28–35 of the Maastricht Principles).  
213  U.N. Norms, supra note 170, at art. 1. Due to their sphere of competence, TNCs are capable of 
securing access to objects of basic socio-economic rights (such as food, water, essential medication, 
books and other educational materials and programs, and computer technologies). Moreover, 
TNCs can use their influence in international decision-making, norm-setting, and institution-
designing processes to contribute to creating and maintaining a just global order, in which the 
universal realization of socio-economic rights is guaranteed. 
214  See Section III.B(2) above. 
215  Vandenbogaerde, supra note 21, at 241; KHALFAN, supra note 9, at 331; Wouter Vandenhole & 
Wolfgang Benedek, Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations and the North-South Divide, in GLOBAL 
JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL 
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 337 (Malcolm Langford et al. eds., 2013). 
216  KHALFAN, supra note 9, at 331; Vandenhole & Benedek, supra note 215, at 338. 
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misunderstanding that global obligations are always distributive and interactional 
obligations of assistance. However, giving concurrent consideration to the 
institutional and relational aspects of global obligations allows for a different 
conclusion. Global institutional obligations to fulfill are primary and simultaneous 
obligations. The degree of implementation of global obligations in a specific 
context is dependent on actors’ capacities, but availability of resources does not 
affect the presence or absence of global obligations.217 Members of the 
international community, lacking sufficient resources, are not exempt from 
contributing to implementing global obligations. Moreover, they are obliged to 
cooperate in order to find and multiply available means and resources. Hence, a 
“position to assist” is not an appropriate normative basis for allocating global 
obligations.218 
E. Summary 
The recognition, conceptualization, and implementation of extraterritorial 
obligations of multiple actors is an important precondition for the “quantum leap” 
from a regime of international justice to one of global justice and from a state-
centered to human-centered global order. This transition would not diminish the 
important role of the state, but rather mark its reformation into a human rights-
based political union (Section III.A). The state and civil society should remain two 
important “channels” for representing interests and protecting human rights of 
individuals in the global domain. Two types of extraterritorial obligations—
remedial extraterritorial responsibilities and global obligations—are simultaneous, 
frequently overlap, and may arise from the non-fulfillment of obligations of the 
other type (Section III.C). All global actors—states, IGOs, NSAs, and 
individuals—should be recognized as primary agents of global justice (Section 
III.B) and duty-bearers of global obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill socio-
economic rights (Section III.D). 
IV.  GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS  
This Section outlines a concept of global human rights obligations and teases 
out the major inconsistencies of traditional views on such obligations (Section 
IV.A). To explain the nature and content of global obligations, it defends basic 
equality as their foundational principle (Section IV.B), and, on that ground, 
considers what human rights obligations should be ensured in the domains of 
global relational (Section IV.C) and distributive (Section IV.D) justice. 
                                                 
217 See Limburg Principles, supra note 130, at principle 23; Arjun K. Sengupta, Study on the Current 
State of Progress in the Implementation of the Right to Development, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1999/WG.18/2 (June 27, 1999). 
218  For details, see Pribytkova, supra note 78, at 289. 
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A.  Common Prejudices about Global Obligations  
Unlike remedial extraterritorial obligations that presuppose a causal link 
between multiple actors’ acts or omissions and individuals’ inability to enjoy socio-
economic rights, global obligations bind subjects (right-holders and duty-bearers) 
that are not involved in any legally relevant causal relations. 
The legal theory of global obligations is in its embryonic stage. This Article 
proceeds to delineate its main contours, starting from common prejudices about 
global obligations, which this Section aims to correct. Some of these prejudices 
are expressed in the Maastricht Principles, which are still the only (soft) law 
document that has acknowledged states’ global obligations and represent the 
prevailing interpretation of global obligations. As mentioned in Section I, the 
concept of global obligations is not sufficiently developed in the Maastricht 
Principles and the comments to them, as they pay more attention to remedial 
extraterritorial obligations. The interpretation they offer is limited in several 
respects: (1) they concentrate only on states’ extraterritorial obligations (though 
claiming to be applicable to IGOs as well), whereas global obligations of NSAs 
and individuals fall beyond their scope; (2) they fail to overcome a state-centered 
view on global obligations; (3) they leave open issues surrounding a normative 
basis for, and status of, global obligations; and (4) they treat global obligations as 
obligations of conduct rather than obligations of result, which leads to inadequate 
understandings of their content and scope. This Section takes a closer look at 
these lacunae and ways to fill them. 
First, as demonstrated, the bearers of global obligations are not only states 
but also IGOs, NSAs, and individuals. The Maastricht Principles should, 
therefore, be supplemented by instruments regulating direct global obligations of 
actors other than states.219 In particular, an important role should be played by the 
Legally Binding Instrument. 
Second, the Maastricht Principles fail to overcome a state-centered view of 
global obligations. This results not only from their focus on the duties of the state 
and IGOs, thereby bypassing obligations of NSAs and individuals. The state-
centered approach manifests itself in the first instance through the Maastricht 
Principles’ emphasis not on ensuring the enjoyment of socio-economic rights by 
individuals, but on enabling states to realize their territorial obligations. For 
example, it is states rather than individuals that are subjects of a legitimate request 
                                                 
219  On implementing the Maastricht Principles to regulate activities of other actors, see Ashfaq Khalfan 
& Ian Seiderman, Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations: Wider Implications of the Maastricht Principles 
and the Continuing Accountability Challenge, in CHALLENGING TERRITORIALITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: 
FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTI DUTY-BEARER HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME (Wouter 
Vandenhole ed., 2015). 
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for, and recipients of, international assistance.220 A shift from a state-centered to 
a human-centered global order requires the recognition of individuals as major 
right-holders, which have justified claim-rights to social support and global 
assistance as well as claim-rights to just local and global basic structures that are 
directed to their own governments, other global actors, and the international 
community as a whole.221 
Third, the Maastricht Principles do not specify a legal basis for global 
obligations.222 This, in turn, leaves open the question of the status of global 
obligations. Principle 8 defines the legal basis of the obligations of a global 
character quite broadly: global obligations are “set out in the Charter of the United 
Nations and human rights instruments.”223 This Article develops an idea that 
global obligations are human rights obligations based on two fundamental 
entitlements enshrined in the UDHR: (1) the entitlement “to realization, through 
national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the 
organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural 
rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality”; 
and (2) the entitlement “to a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”224 The latter 
entitlement specifies the institutional nature of obligations and is an integral part 
of the former. They both demonstrate the dual nature of global human rights 
obligations, which include interactional obligations to realize socio-economic 
rights universally and institutional obligations to create and maintain a just global 
order.225 Though the right to a just global order is not explicitly enshrined in the 
ICESCR and the CRC, the CESCR and the U.N. CRC recognize that their goals 
include promoting a fair global structure necessary to ensure Conventions rights. 
With these aims, they call for removing structural impediments to a just 
international order and for creating the enabling environment (both a normative 
                                                 
220  See ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principles 33–35 of the Maastricht Principles). 
221  See TAN, supra note 28, at 71. 
222  See Vandenhole, supra note 6. It is possible, however, that this task was intentionally reserved for 
comments that can be considered an authentic interpretation, since they are made by the authors 
of the Maastricht Principles. See De Schutter et al., supra note 15. 
223  ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principle 8 of the Maastricht Principles). 
224  UDHR, supra note 2, at arts. 22, 28.  
225  Cf. “the right of everyone to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set 
forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments can be 
fully realized.” Declaration on the Right and Responsibility, supra note 133, art. 18.3. 
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and institutional structure) necessary for the universal realization of basic socio-
economic rights.226 
Fourth, the Maastricht Principles treat global obligations as obligations of 
conduct, addressing actors’ efforts and processes, rather than obligations of result, 
which focus on the achievements and outcomes of actors’ activities.227 In 
particular, they describe global obligations as obligations to “take action,” “take 
steps,” “cooperate,” “assist,” “regulate,” and “influence” rather than obligations 
to “realize,” “create,” “provide,” or “ensure.”228 Thus, obligations of international 
cooperation and assistance, requiring only the undertaking of certain measures 
rather than the achievement of certain goals (namely, the universal 
implementation of basic socio-economic rights and the creation of a just global 
order) come to the fore. The tendency to interpret global obligations as obligations 
to cooperate and assist also prevails in contemporary legal discourse229 and 
practice.230 
This tradition is rooted in the U.N. Charter’s statement that the U.N.’s 
ultimate purposes are developing “friendly relations among nations” and 
achieving peaceful international co-operation,231 which are regarded as obligations 
                                                 
226  CESCR Gen. Comment No. 24, supra note 155, at ¶ 37 (Aug. 10, 2017); Comm. on the Rights of 
the Child, Gen. Comment No. 24, Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/24, 
¶ 29 (Sept. 18, 2019); see also Limburg Principles, supra note 130, at principle 30. 
227  For this classification, see Rüdiger Wolfrum, Obligation of Result Versus Obligation of Conduct: Some 
Thoughts About the Implementation of International Obligations, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 363 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 
2010); Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 156 (1987); SEPÚLVEDA, 
supra note 199, at 184; SKOGLY, supra note 11, at 32–34. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill notes that formulating 
obligations as those of conduct prevails in international relations, whereas domestic duties are more 
frequently recognized as obligations of results. See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Obligations of Conduct and 
Result, in THE RIGHT TO FOOD 112 (Philip Alston & Katarina Tomaševski eds., 1984). 
228  See, for example, ETO Consortium, supra note 7, (Parts III–V of the Maastricht Principles). Principle 
8 defines global obligations as obligations “to take action, separately, and jointly through 
international cooperation, to realize human rights universally”. Institutional global obligations are 
also formulated as obligations of conduct: “States must take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps, 
separately, and jointly through international cooperation, to create an international enabling 
environment.” Id. at principle 29.  
229  See for example, Sepúlveda, supra note 11; KARIMOVA, supra note 19; VANDENBOGAERDE, supra note 
6. 
230  See, for example, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 4, The Right to 
Adequate Housing (art. 11(1) of the Covenant), ¶¶ 10, 13, 19, U.N. Doc. E/1993/23 (Dec. 13, 
1991) [hereinafter CESCR Gen. Comment No. 4]; CESCR Gen. Comment No. 12, supra note 130, 
at ¶¶ 36, 38, 40; CESCR Gen. Comment No. 14, supra note 130, at ¶¶ 38, 40, 45, 63; CESCR Gen. 
Comment No. 15, supra note 130, at ¶¶ 30–38. 
231  “International co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
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of result. Other goals, including the realization of human rights, are, therefore, 
subordinate to these ultimate purposes. The reasons for this interpretation are 
quite understandable: the U.N. Charter was signed after the end of the Second 
World War, on June 26, 1945. Hence, the Charter embodied the idea of peaceful 
cooperation between countries, which was a fundamental international aim in the 
post-War context. More than seventy years later, however, not merely peaceful 
cooperation but also the creation of a just global order indispensable for the 
realization of human rights should be recognized as an essential purpose of 
(members of) the international community.232 
The ICESCR also interprets global obligations as duties of conduct.233 The 
CESCR, however, comments that general legal obligations corresponding to the 
socio-economic rights recognized in the ICESCR include both duties of conduct 
and duties of result. Although global obligations corresponding to socio-
economic rights are supposed to be implemented progressively, they aim at 
achieving concrete results—the full realization of socio-economic rights 
universally,234 and some global obligations are obligations of immediate effect.235 
This Article suggests a new classification of global obligations. Under this 
classification, global obligations in their interactional and institutional aspects 
comprehend both duties of result (to realize socio-economic rights necessary for 
the enjoyment of a decent standard of living worldwide and to create a just global 
institutional structure indispensable for their realization) and duties of conduct (to 
cooperate and to assist in the implementation of socio-economic rights).236 
As mentioned in the previous Section, another common prejudice is the 
belief that global obligations are secondary and consequent obligations, the 
                                                 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” U.N. 
Charter, art. 1, ¶¶ 2–3. See also arts. 55–56. 
232  See, for example, U.N., The Three Pillars of the United Nations, http://perma.cc/68YV-7XZC. 
233  “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures.” ICESCR, supra note 27, at art. 2 ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
234  Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 3, The Nature of States Parties’ 
Obligations (art 2., ¶ 1 of the Covenant), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter 
CESCR Gen. Comment No. 3]; Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, supra note 153, at ¶ 8.   
235  Applying the CESCR Gen. Comment No. 3 to extraterritorial obligations, those of immediate effect 
are the following: aimed to eliminate discrimination; to “take steps,” in particular, to cooperate and 
assist (¶ 2); minimum core obligations (¶ 10); relatively low-cost targeted programmes for 
vulnerable individuals (¶ 12); obligations corresponding to socio-economic rights that are not 
subject to progressive realization (¶ 5). CESCR Gen. Comment No. 3, supra note 234. 
236  This Article focuses predominantly on global obligations of result; for a detailed analysis of global 
obligations of conduct, see Pribytkova, supra note 78, at 222–333. 
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implementation of which depends on whether and to what extent home states 
have realized their territorial obligations.237 This position, however, is incorrect if 
one considers institutional obligations corresponding to the human right to a just 
global order, which are primary and simultaneous obligations of multiple actors. 
This means that their realization is not related to the ability of a home state to 
fulfill its territorial human rights obligations and that they should be implemented 
in parallel to territorial obligations. Global institutional obligations include the 
obligations: (1) to elaborate a normative framework regulating extraterritorial 
obligations of multiple actors; (2) to create and maintain a system of institutions 
necessary for removing structural impediments to a just global order and for the 
implementation of global obligations; and (3) to develop monitoring and 
accountability bodies, especially individual complaint mechanisms, at regional and 
international levels to enforce effective and affordable remedies for socio-
economic rights violations universally. 
Finally, global obligations are often unreasonably viewed predominantly as 
duties of distributive justice.238 The following analysis seeks to discredit this 
prejudice.  
B.  Basic, Relational , and Distributive Equality  
To explain the nature and content of global obligations, this Section turns to 
the concept of basic equality and its relational and distributive implications. As 
Beitz rightly notes, “cosmopolitanism of any sort rests on a fundamental 
commitment to treat all persons in some relevant sense as equals.”239 Basic 
equality, which demands respect for and treatment of all individuals as equals in 
human dignity and human rights, is a normative basis for obligations to implement 
human rights universally. This Section demonstrates that it is the entitlement to 
basic equality that is the actual foundation of global obligations in the domains of 
relational and distributive justice. 
It is possible to distinguish between three interrelated interpretations of 
equality: (1) basic equality (or equality of status) that proceeds from the assumption 
that people are equal holders of dignity and human rights;240 (2) relational equality 
that presupposes the relation of persons to each other as equals in particular 
                                                 
237  See, for example, BEITZ, supra note 184, at 106. 
238  See, for example, BEITZ, supra note 43, at 125–53; WORLD POVERTY, supra note 43, at 43–45; TAN, 
supra note 28, at 19. 
239  BEITZ, supra note 43, at 208. 
240  For various conceptions of basic equality or equality of status, see David Miller, Equality and Justice, 
10 RATIO 222 (1997); Richard J. Arneson, Egalitarianism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (2013), http://perma.cc/UCY4-6PZR; WALDRON, supra note 33. 
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contexts;241 and (3) distributive equality that requires individuals to have equal 
amounts of something.242 Important aspects of these understandings of equality 
and how they relate to global obligations are outlined below. 
First, as Waldron shows, basic equality points to a special status of all persons 
as members of humanity that is indivisible into “sorts” and “ranks.”243 Basic 
equality is justified as both a thin (political) and thick (comprehensive) concept. 
The political idea of basic equality is at the core of the conception of universal 
human rights and has found its embodiment in the International Bill of Human 
Rights. In this sense, Dworkin defended a fundamental “right to treatment as an 
equal,” or the “right to equal concern and respect in the design and administration 
of the political institutions that govern them,” as opposed to the derivative “right 
to equal treatment.”244 This right should serve as a principle for ordering 
institutions in both local and global domains. As a comprehensive idea, basic 
equality is rooted in various philosophical, religious, moral, and cultural doctrines 
from different epochs and schools of thought.245 For example, in A Writer’s Diary, 
Fyodor Dostoevsky articulated foundational intuitions of basic equality as follows: 
“I am in no way beneath thee in moral worth and . . . , as a person, I am equal to 
thee.”246 
Equality of status has several important features. First, it belongs to all 
human beings (universality). Second, all persons are entitled to a status of moral 
subjects irrespective of their social or financial state (unconditionality). Third, no 
individual can be deprived, nor deprive themselves, of this status, even if their 
troubled financial or social state is a result of their own choices (inalienability). 
Finally, it presupposes all individuals’ ability to participate in all core social, 
                                                 
241  Different approaches to relational equality are suggested in Elizabeth Anderson, What Is the Point of 
Equality? 109 ETHICS 287 (1999); Samuel Scheffler, The Practice of Equality, in SOCIAL EQUALITY: 
ESSAYS ON WHAT IT MEANS TO BE EQUALS 21 (Carina Fourie et al. eds., 2015); Forst, supra note 
44; THOMAS SCANLON, WHY DOES INEQUALITY MATTER? (2018). 
242  For an analysis of the difference between equality of status and distributive equality, see Elena 
Pribytkova, A Decent Social Minimum as a Matter of Justice, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN POVERTY 
ALLEVIATION 43 (Helmut Gaisbauer et al. eds., 2016). 
243  WALDRON, supra note 33, at 6. 
244  See DWORKIN, supra note 84, at 218, 273; RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 411 (2002). 
245  The idea of basic moral equality can be found in Rawls’ classification of two concepts of equality: 
“equality as it is invoked in connection with the distribution of certain goods, some of which will 
almost certainly give higher status or prestige to those who are more favored, and equality as it 
applies to the respect which is owed to persons irrespective of their social position.” Rawls believed 
that the second type of equality, basic equality, should be prioritized over distributive equality. 
RAWLS, supra note 37, at 511.  
246  DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 512. Dostoyevsky can be considered the founder of moral-religious 
tradition in Russian legal philosophy. 
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political, and cultural institutions and practices of (global) society that influence 
their human rights, and the enjoyment of secure access to shared material and 
intellectual values (ability to be full-fledged members of a global society). Basic equality is a 
fundamental entitlement of a person as a member of human society irrespective 
of their role in a family, small social groups, or the state. 
Grounded in cosmopolitan intuitions, human rights require that basic 
equality transcends borders and is guaranteed to all individuals of the world.247 
The idea of basic equality should guide extraterritorial relations, global norm-
setting, and institutional design.248 Since an extreme degree of inequality in 
relationships between individuals and within distributive institutional schemes 
worldwide casts doubt on the very possibility of the enjoyment of human dignity 
and human rights, basic equality should precede and underpin spheres of relational 
and distributive justice. 
Second, relational equality approaches are built on opposition to distributive 
egalitarianism.249 Defenders of these approaches seek to prove that equality is not 
a distributive value but rather a relational one.250 In addition, they doubt that 
distributive equality is valuable by itself. The value of any particular distributive 
guarantee is determined based upon its ability to serve as a means to achieve a 
society of equals.251 
How do basic and relational equality interrelate? On the one hand, basic 
equality and relational equality are closely interconnected252—they both demand 
that individuals are treated and regarded as equals, in other words, with equal 
concern and respect.253 Extremely unfair relations that divide people into classes 
and make them feel like different kinds of human beings are incompatible with 
basic equality. In this sense, the contemporary normative and institutional global 
order favoring powerful actors and residents of rich countries at the cost of the 
vast majority of the world’s population—while causing discrimination, social 
exclusion, and marginalization of the latter—infringes on both relational and basic 
equality. 
                                                 
247  TAN, supra note 28, at 1, 6, 10. 
248  Pogge, supra note 28, at 49. 
249  WALDRON, supra note 33, at 11. 
250  See Anderson, supra note 241, at 313; Scheffler, supra note 241, at 22; SCANLON, supra note 241, at 
1-10. 
251  In view of this, “the relevant question in thinking about equality and distribution, is not ‘What is 
the currency of which justice requires an equal distribution?’ It is rather ‘What kinds of distributions 
are consistent with the ideal of a society of equals?” Scheffler, supra note 241, at 22. 
252  Some researchers do not make a clear distinction between basic equality and relational equality. 
Drawing the line between them allows casting light upon the nature of various types of global 
obligations. 
253  KASPER LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, RELATIONAL EGALITARIANISM: LIVING AS EQUALS 70 (2018). 
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On the other hand, basic equality includes not only a relational (comparative) 
component but also an absolute one, insofar as it proceeds from the recognition 
of human dignity and human rights. Acknowledgement of an absolute value of a 
person excludes so-called “leveling down” (equalization below a certain minimally 
decent threshold).254 Relational equality, however, is per se fully compatible with 
such leveling down: after all, individuals can consider each other equal members 
of society even without having notions of dignity and human rights, or even when 
outright rejecting these ideas (consider, for example, people in a primitive society 
or a band of robbers). Therefore, an essential demand that basic equality imports 
to the sphere of relational justice is to follow this absolute standard of human-
centricity—the recognition of human dignity and human rights.255 In this respect, 
basic equality represents the core principle of a global society of equals, which is 
to be concretized in different contexts through the application of the norms of 
relational justice. 
Third, distributive equality requires persons to have equal amounts of 
something (such as resources, social goods, income, or capabilities). Although 
equality of status is interrelated with distributive equality, there is no direct 
connection between them.256 Equal distribution of socially valuable goods or 
resources is not a guarantee that people are regarded and treated as equals; and 
contrariwise, even unequal distribution schemes do not prevent members of 
society from enjoying equality of status.257 At the same time, distributive 
inequalities tend to translate into both basic and relational inequality.258 
The enjoyment of basic equality is impossible in the context of extreme 
poverty. Hence, the current global order that causes (or allows) thousands of 
deaths from poverty every day contradicts the very idea of equality of status. 
Moreover, empirical evidence reveals that extreme distributive inequality 
negatively affects the enjoyment of human dignity and fundamental human 
                                                 
254  On levelling down objection, see RAZ, supra note 91, at 227, 229, 235; Harry Frankfurt, Equality as 
a Moral Ideal, 98 ETHICS 21 (1987). 
255  Lippert-Rasmussen shows that even “extremely hierarchical social relations” may be consistent with 
treating each other as moral equals, under conditions of respect for human dignity and human 
rights. LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, supra note 253. 
256  See Pribytkova, supra note 242, at 46. 
257  See Arneson, supra note 240. 
258  Political thinker Michael Walzer provides an excellent analysis of the conversion of inequalities 
between various spheres of justice. He demonstrates that those having the edge (greater wealth or 
higher power) in one area intend to utilize them for their domination in other areas as well, while 
the worse off in one domain are also frequently disadvantaged in other domains. See generally 
SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note 42. Miller convincingly argues that Walzer’s idea should be read as 
an idea about status. See David Miller, Complex Equality, in PLURALISM, JUSTICE, AND EQUALITY 206 
(David Miller & Michael Walzer eds., 1995). On inequality penetrating all aspects of life, see also 
WORLD POVERTY, supra note 43, at 203–05. 
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rights.259 Widening inequalities of distribution facilitate the division of a global 
society into first-class and second-class humans, which is incompatible with basic 
equality. 
Thus, a global distributive scheme that imposes extreme poverty undermines 
the grounds for equality of status, while extreme distributive inequality has severe 
negative consequences for both basic equality and relational equality.260 To achieve 
basic equality, the global scheme must ensure minimum guarantees of protection 
from poverty and extreme inequality, as well as secure access to a dignified 
existence, as a matter of distributive justice.261 
Understanding the differences between basic, relational, and distributive 
equality is essential for grasping the nature and content of global obligations. As 
this Section specifies, relational and distributive equality are not valuable per se.262 
Inequalities in relations (for example, hierarchical subordination of employees or 
military personnel) and distribution (for example, progressive taxation, positive 
discrimination in favor of the most vulnerable individuals and social groups, or 
social assistance to those in need) are morally and legally acceptable insofar as they 
correspond to basic equality, with its recognition of the absolute value of 
individuals, their human dignity and human rights. Neglect of basic equality means 
trampling human dignity and human rights, which cannot be justified in the 
modern world. It is, therefore, basic equality, and not relational or distributive 
equality, that serves as the foundation of relational and distributive justice.263 Basic 
equality is also a normative basis for global human rights obligations in the spheres 
of relational and distributive justice. 
To summarize, global human rights obligations aim to ensure certain 
minimum guarantees in the domains of relational and distributive justice that are 
essential for the enjoyment of basic equality as a core demand of global justice. As 
the following Sections will demonstrate, the domain of relational justice should 
                                                 
259  For instance, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Philip Alston, 
provides an important overview of how extreme distributive inequalities in the global domain bring 
about an unfair normative and institutional order that advantages the most powerful actors and has 
“detrimental effects” on the enjoyment of human rights by others. Philip Alston, Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, extreme inequality and human rights, 
¶¶ 26–32, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/31 (2015). See also generally MILANOVIC, supra note 35. 
260  The translatability of distributive inequalities into relational inequality is, however, indirect and 
contextual. See Miller, supra note 240, at 224, 237. 
261  I agree with Waldron that basic equality directly presupposes certain distributive guarantees. See 
WALDRON, supra note 33, at 12. 
262  Cf. SCANLON, supra note 241; Frankfurt, supra note 254. 
263  For the interrelation between equality and justice, see Miller, supra note 23; Miller, supra note 240. 
It is necessary to clarify that the difference between institutional and interactional obligations 
introduced in Sections II.C and IV.A should not be associated with the difference between the 
domains of relational and distributive justice, each of which organizes the relationship and 
implementation of institutional and interactional duties in its own way. 
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realize global human rights obligations of multiple actors to create and maintain a 
just institutional structure that ensures individuals’ full-fledged participation in it. 
A global distributive scheme should embody the minimum human rights 
guarantees of a dignified life (a decent social minimum) universally. 
C. Global Obligations of Relational Justice  
This Section addresses global obligations in the domain of relational justice 
aimed at improving the contemporary global order, which is structurally unjust 
and which severely infringes on basic equality and socio-economic rights. This 
order is shaped by the most powerful actors (developed states, key IGOs, and 
major TNCs) that exercise actual control over and benefit disproportionally from 
core global institutions while leaving billions in poverty. Global rules and 
principles governing the most significant areas of human life, including legal, 
economic, political, social, and cultural spheres, disparately impact the poorest 
individuals and societies.264 
Global relational injustice manifests itself through rule-making and 
institution-designing processes in world politics, international law, trade, and 
finance. As the following (non-exhaustive) list of examples demonstrates, these 
processes violate socio-economic rights. 
First, developed states dominate in the decision-making processes of 
international financial institutions, including the IMF and the World Bank.265 
Despite their insistence on fidelity to human rights and the rule of law, these 
institutions act “outside any global good governance regime for the protection of 
the rights of those affected by their policies,”266 as evidenced by their long-
standing and numerous socio-economic rights violations267 and the 
impoverishment of individuals in developing countries.268 
                                                 
264  See TAN, supra note 28, at 25. 
265  The Bretton Woods Institutions, which predominantly represent the developed North states, have 
been criticized as neo-colonial institutions ignorant to the voices of developing countries. See, for 
example, Report of the High-Level Task Force on the Implementation of the Right to Development 
on its Second Meeting, ¶ 74, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/WG.18/TF/3 (2005); Linah K. Mohohlo, 
A Change in Mind-Set is Needed if Aid is to Remain Relevant, in THE DONORS’ DILEMMA: EMERGENCE, 
CONVERGENCE AND THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN AID (Andy Sumner & Tom Kirk eds., 2014). 
266  CLAPHAM, supra note 25, at 5. 
267  See Alston’s critique of the Bretton Woods Institutions as a “human rights-free zone.” The World 
Bank and Human Rights, supra note 161; The Role of the IMF, supra note 161. 
268  The Structural Adjustment Programmes implemented by the IMF and the World Bank provided 
loans to developing countries under harsh and detrimental conditions “often proved to have more 
adverse consequences than the initial problem itself,” such as budget cuts for social services or 
privatization of essential state-owned resources that allowed foreign investors, especially TNCs, to 
become their owners. See Sachin Chaturvedi, The Development Compact: A Theoretical Construct for South-
South Cooperation, RIS Discussion Papers, Discussion Paper # 203 4 (2016); ISSA G. SHIVJI, SILENCES 
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Second, the WTO’s non-transparent and unfair decision-making processes 
are biased in favor of developed states and large TNCs and impose global rules 
and institutions that negatively affect the enjoyment of human rights in developing 
societies.269 Alleviating the WTO’s protectionism of developed states’ markets 
would help several hundred million people escape from poverty by themselves.270 
Third, cases relating to extraterritorial activities of large TNCs include 
numerous investment projects that are carried out without conducting HRDD 
that involve all potential stakeholders (individuals and communities), resulting in 
severe violations of stakeholders’ basic socio-economic rights.271 
Fourth, big pharmaceutical companies disproportionally focus on the spread 
of diseases in developed countries, ignoring the right to health of the global poor 
and allowing for millions of preventable deaths annually.272 
Fifth, development assistance policies and projects implemented by Western 
donor-states, IGOs, international foundations, and NGOs are often used as a 
                                                 
IN NGO DISCOURSE: THE ROLE AND FUTURE OF NGOS IN AFRICA 14–16, 41 (2007); JOSEPH E. 
STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS ch. 1-2 (2002); William Easterly, What Did 
Structural Adjustment Adjust? The Association of Policies and Growth with Repeated IMF and World Bank 
Adjustment Loans, 76 J. DEVELOPMENT ECON. (2005); Elham Seyedsayamdost, A World Without 
Poverty: Negotiating the Global Development Agenda 75–94 (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Columbia University). 
269  For example, the international intellectual property regime under the WTO TRIPS agreement 
violates the right to adequate food and the right to health in poor societies. The WTO treaty system 
practice pushes poor countries to open their markets while impeding access for their production to 
markets of developed states. This practice prevents the residents of developing countries from 
enjoying the right to a decent standard of living. See Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or 
Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339 (2002); Jagdish 
N. Bhagwati, Reshaping the WTO, 168 FAR EASTERN ECON. REV. 25 (2005); GLOBAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 13, at 139. See also Statement of the Third World Network at the WTO Symposia 
on Trade and Environment and Trade and Development (Ma. 1999), http://perma.cc/A3AN-2KR2. 
270  Opening markets would allow poor countries to receive additional export earnings (according to 
the UNCTAD, $700 billion annually) and gain wealth (according to Pogge, over $100 billion 
annually), which is comparable to contemporary ODA rates ($146.6 billion). See UNCTAD, TRADE 
AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT IX, 143 (1999); POLITICS, supra note 43, at 20; OECD Development 
Aid, supra note 114. The OECD estimates that elimination of all merchandise tariffs and reduction 
in trade costs by 1% would increase welfare in developing states by $90.05 billion a year. PATRICK 
LOVE & RALPH LATTIMORE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: FREE, FAIR AND OPEN? 60 (2009). 
271  See, for example, FIAN International, Case Work, http://perma.cc/45R4-7GT4; COOMANS & 
KÜNNEMANN, supra note 154, at 5. 
272  PAUL HUNT ET AL. NEGLECTED DISEASES: A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS (2007); Paul Hunt, Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Physical and Mental Health, The Right to Health, IV, U.N. Doc. A/63/263 (2008); 
GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 13, at 145; WORLD POVERTY, supra note 43, at 222–23.  
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means for dominating developing societies.273 Such policies and projects often fail 
to take into account the actual needs of the poor and are extremely inefficient, 
insufficient, and violate the human rights of recipients of assistance.274 
In all of these examples, we see global institutional injustice, which manifests 
itself not in harmful programs of the international distribution of social goods or 
resources, but in the lack of institutional guarantees of the relation between 
individuals from developing and developed countries (acting directly or indirectly 
through their states or other representatives) as equals in the processes of creating 
global norms, policies, institutions, and practices. This global relational injustice is 
the cause of distributive injustice, global poverty, and extreme inequality. Such 
detrimental effects cannot be eliminated without the removal of their cause. 
Furthermore, relational injustice distorts the allocation of jurisdiction over 
issues concerning global distributive justice. Most salient, perhaps, is the resistance 
of powerful Western states to solving problems related to global distributive 
injustice within the U.N., keeping them under the jurisdiction of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions, over which they exercise control.275 Ironically, it is the actors 
who press for a program of democratization and liberalization in developing 
countries that prevent these reforms in the global domain. The prevailing view is 
that liberal wealthy states are interested in relational justice at the cost of a 
distributive one.276 However, this seems to be true only at the local level. In the 
global domain, powerful states express no interest in limiting their dominance for 
the sake of relational justice. Instead, they prefer reducing the problem of global 
justice to issues of development assistance, which is interpreted not as a human 
rights-based obligation but as a voluntary commitment of donors.277 
Obligations of relational justice should have priority over those of 
distributive justice. This would allow targeting the main efforts against global 
poverty and extreme inequality not only at their consequences, but also at their 
                                                 
273  See Gay J. McDougall, A Decade of NGO Struggle, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 12, 15 (2004); Makau Mutua, 
Human Rights International NGOs: A Critical Evaluation, in NGOS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: PROMISE AND 
PERFORMANCE 151 (C.E. Welch, Jr. ed., 2001). 
274  Public and private assistance programs are often carried out without involving poor individuals or 
their representatives and without undertaking HRIAs with the participation of the latter. Those in 
poverty are presumed to be helpless, irresponsible, and incapable of being full-fledged subjects, 
both right-holders and duty-bearers, in extraterritorial relations and agents of change. See 
Pribytkova, supra note 78, at 305–15. See also generally DAMBISA MOYO, DEAD AID: WHY AID IS NOT 
WORKING AND HOW THERE IS A BETTER WAY FOR AFRICA (2009); WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE 
WHITE MAN’S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST’S EFFORTS TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL 
AND SO LITTLE GOOD (2006). 
275   See Margot Salomon, From NIEO to Now and the Unfinishable Story of Economic Justice, 62 INT’L & COMP. 
L. Q. 31, 50–51 (2013). 
276  See TAN, supra note 28, at 8. 
277  See also VANDENBOGAERDE, supra note 6, at 69. 
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cause. Under conditions of fair relations in the process of global decision-making, 
fair principles of distributive justice could be embedded in international norms 
and institutions. Moreover, as contemporary studies demonstrate, a just global 
institutional system that does not violate human rights of people in developing 
countries may be sufficient for their self-rescue from poverty.278  
Basic equality establishes a minimum standard of justice—the recognition of 
equal moral value of individuals—for both local and global domains. Though 
basic equality does not, using Dworkin’s language, demand that individuals be 
treated equally, it nonetheless requires them to be treated and respected as equals, 
regardless of their place of birth, residence, or citizenship, by all agents of 
justice.279 A just global institutional order should enable individuals to enjoy equal 
status and to act as full-fledged agents in the global domain—to take part in 
creating and maintaining the key institutions that influence their exercising of 
human rights.280 
How should individuals’ full-fledged agency be guaranteed in the global 
order? Section III.B(2) pointed to two main ways for individuals to be represented 
in the global domain: through their state and through participation in global civil 
society. An internationally-recognized way to exercise the right to take part in the 
design and administration of global institutions is political participation in the 
affairs of one’s state. However, this tool often fails for two reasons: the 
undemocratic structure of many states and the unfair global institutional scheme. 
In the state-centered order, the most vulnerable individuals can hardly speak on 
their own behalf and be heard, and are unable to directly seek assistance from the 
international community or hold their state and global actors accountable for 
violations of their human rights. Relatedly, the unfair organization of the global 
order prevents individuals’ full-fledged agency: first, by not taking into account 
the interests of individuals by major global actors in creating and implementing 
policies, which affect their enjoyment of human rights; and second, through the 
dominance of developed states over developing ones in global rule-making and 
institutional design. Under these conditions, the recognition of individuals’ agency 
in the global domain is the only way for them to assert and to realize human rights 
associated with their membership in humanity. 
Thus, the imperative of basic equality calls for two measures in the domain 
of relational justice. On the one hand, it demands the recognition of individuals 
                                                 
278  See POLITICS, supra note 43, at 20; Thomas Pogge, Poverty and Human Rights, http://perma.cc/FF8L-
LMZS. 
279  See DWORKIN, supra note 84, at 218, 273. 
280  Various versions of this right have been justified by scholars. For example, by Dworkin as the “right 
to equal concern and respect” in the design and administration of the institutions governing 
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as full-fledged subjects of extraterritorial relations with the ability to assert their 
rights directly, as well as through their social and state networks. This includes 
ensuring their access to information about and participation in all decision-
making, norm-setting, and institution-designing processes that concern their 
human rights, including ex ante and ex post HRIAs and HRDD, as well as providing 
their direct and affordable access to effective remedies. On the other hand, it 
requires guarantees of representation of individuals’ interests by the state that 
governs them. These imply measures to correct the asymmetries in international 
decision-making processes by ensuring fair representation of developing states as 
equal members of the international community and taking into account the 
fundamental interests and human rights of people, especially the most vulnerable 
individuals and social groups, that they are representing.281 
In this respect, the right to a just global order gives rise not only to remedial 
institutional obligations (aimed at correcting the injustice of the contemporary 
institutional scheme), but also to global institutional obligations (focused on filling 
the gaps in the existing international human rights instruments and creating new 
normative instruments, institutions, and practices). As demonstrated, not only 
negative obligations to respect,282 but also positive obligations to protect and 
fulfill, correspond to the right to a just global order. The obligations to prevent 
unjust practices by third parties and create a just global institutional scheme, apply 
not only to actors responsible for violations of their negative duties, but to all 
global players. Though actors engaged in creating and maintaining unjust practices 
bear primary obligations to compensate victims for the harms they cause, 
relational justice cannot be achieved without the engagement of the most 
vulnerable subjects. Relational justice can be realized only through these subjects’ 
full-fledged participation in significant decision-making, norm-setting, and 
institution-designing processes. Only collective action involving all stakeholders 
can, therefore, lead to the significant structural changes that are necessary on local, 
regional, and global levels. 
D.  Global Obligations of Distributive Justice   
Along with guarantees of relational justice, global human rights obligations 
call for certain distributive arrangements that are indispensable for the universal 
enjoyment of basic socio-economic rights. This Section discusses global 
obligations of distributive justice. 
                                                 
281  See Office of U.N. High Comm. for Hum. Rights, Principles and Guidelines for a Human Rights 
Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies, ¶ 104(c), U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/06/12 (2006). 
282  Pogge justifies a negative duty “toward every other” not to contribute, individually or in 
cooperation, in creating or maintaining an unjust global structure. WORLD POVERTY, supra note 43, 
at 177. This Article intends to avoid reducing obligations, which correspond to the right to a just 
global order, to merely corrective duties to compensate for the caused harm. 
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Although basic equality does not require an equal distribution of resources, 
wealth, or income either among states or between individuals, it is incompatible 
with conditions of extreme poverty and extreme inequality. That is why basic 
equality represents a demand for securing universal access to a decent social 
minimum, which is a key principle of social and global justice. 
These intuitions underlie the international community’s recognition of the 
right to an adequate standard of living.283 The UDHR and the ICESCR 
acknowledge this right, along with states’ corresponding obligations to “take 
appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect 
the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.”284 
In its Comments, the CESCR specifies global obligations to cooperate and assist 
corresponding to the components of the right to an adequate standard of living 
(which include the rights to adequate food, water, sanitation, housing, and 
health).285 Thus, international law initially proceeded from the premises that the 
right to a decent standard of living should be realized not only locally but also 
globally, and that not only states, but also other global actors and the international 
community as a whole, bear duties corresponding to that right. 
Although the right to a decent standard of living is at the center of the 
minimum socio-economic conditions necessary for the realization of a decent 
social minimum, it does not exhaust them. The implementation of other basic 
socio-economic rights (including the rights to social security, job security and 
equal employment, decent work conditions, rest and leisure, just and favorable 
remuneration, minimum wage, education, and participation in cultural life) 
constitutes an important guarantee of a decent social minimum. 
This raises a question regarding the scope of the guarantees embraced by a 
global social minimum. The most authoritative theory of justice, developed by 
Rawls, yields the “maximin” or “difference” principle. This principle calls for an 
institutional order that maximizes the benefits of the least advantaged, but it does 
not guarantee that the minimum level of well-being indispensable for enjoying a 
                                                 
283  Historically, the principle of human dignity has been the starting point for the justification of the 
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Pribytkova, The Human Right to a Dignified Existence: The Ethical Foundations of the Contemporary Legal 
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285  See CESCR Gen. Comment No. 4, supra note 230, at ¶¶ 10, 13, 19; CESCR Gen. Comment No. 12, 
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decent life can be achieved in impoverished countries.286 This Article maintains 
that the scope of global obligations to secure a decent social minimum should be 
consistent with the principle of sufficiency. It cannot, therefore, be confined to 
guarantees necessary for mere survival and freedom from extreme poverty, but 
should be sufficient to ensure a dignified social existence of individuals. A 
dignified existence implies individuals’ involvement and full-fledged participation 
in all core social, political, and cultural institutions and practices, including 
important decision-making processes, as well as access to shared material and 
intellectual values and an opportunity for their moral and intellectual 
flourishing.287 In other words, global obligations of distributive justice should 
enable individuals to enjoy a decent life and basic guarantees of relational justice. 
The principle of sufficiency calls for global actors’ obligations to cooperate in 
accumulating enough resources for the universal fulfillment of basic socio-
economic rights indispensable for leading a decent life. 
The principle of sufficiency should be balanced by the principle of a decent 
minimum sacrifice. Under the latter, the burdens of global obligations should be 
compatible with the fundamental interests, human rights, and obligations of global 
actors. Balancing the two principles is possible through a fair allocation of global 
obligations among all members of the international community.288 
As global obligations of relational justice, distributive global obligations 
include not only interactional but also institutional duties, which are simultaneous 
with domestic obligations and are addressed to all members of the international 
community.289 Institutional obligations of distributive justice include: (1) 
                                                 
286  RAWLS, supra note 37, at 46. Referring to Richard Henry Tawney’s metaphor about “a man standing 
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that the difference principle “can be fulfilled while people continue to drown but with less and less 
water over their heads.” According to Jeremy Waldron’s critique, in the original position people 
would prefer a social minimum to the maximin principle, because the former allows honoring 
individual achievements while guaranteeing that their basic needs are met. SHUE, supra note 43, at 
128; Jeremy Waldron, Rawls and the Social Minimum, in JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS. 
COLLECTED PAPERS 1981–1991, 262–63, 267 (1993). Influenced by this criticism, in his later works, 
Rawls himself comes to the recognition of the necessity to ensure a social minimum. See JOHN 
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of sufficiency. See Pribytkova, supra note 78, at 289–99. 
288  Id. at 293–96. 
289  The CESCR and the UNCRC consider global obligations to fulfill socio-economic rights universally 
to be subsidiary. This is primarily due to the fact that they often reduce the distributive aspect of 
global obligations of distributive justice to obligations of developed states to provide international 
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elaborating a global normative framework for ensuring socio-economic 
guarantees of a decent life; (2) creating and maintaining a system of institutions 
for securing access to a decent standard of living universally, including institutions 
for mobilizing resources and providing assistance to those in extreme poverty; and 
(3) developing judicial, quasi-judicial, and non-judicial individual complaint 
mechanisms at regional and international levels for holding multiple actors 
accountable for their breaches of global obligations. 
All members of the international community (states, NSAs, IGOs, and 
individuals) share global human rights obligations to create an institutional system 
necessary for the realization of a decent social minimum. Researchers and 
practitioners have demonstrated successfully that the problems of world poverty 
and the systematic violation of socio-economic rights are caused not by the lack 
of resources, but rather the lack of a fair system of institutions that regulate their 
accumulation and use.290 The world community has sufficient means to eradicate 
poverty, feed all suffering from malnutrition, and provide essential medicine to all 
dying from poverty-related diseases. Global poverty is avoidable at relatively low 
costs (and in compliance with the principle of a decent minimum sacrifice) 
provided that global obligations are fairly distributed among all global actors.291 
E. Summary 
Global human rights obligations that comprehend both duties of result (to 
realize basic socio-economic rights worldwide and to create a global institutional 
structure indispensable for their realization) and duties of conduct (to cooperate 
and assist in their implementation) are primary and simultaneous obligations of 
multiple actors. They are simultaneous in that they should be implemented in 
parallel to territorial human rights obligations (Section IV.A). Global obligations 
are aimed at securing certain minimum guarantees in the domains of relational and 
distributive justice that are essential for the enjoyment of basic equality (Section 
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IV.B). Relational justice guarantees should ensure individuals’ full-fledged 
participation in all key global institutions and practices, including important 
decision-making processes that affect their exercise of socio-economic rights 
(Section IV.C). A global distributive scheme should embody a decent social 
minimum (Section IV.D). 
V.  CONCLUSION  
This Article addressed underexamined issues surrounding global obligations. 
It sought to refute prevailing prejudices about such obligations in contemporary 
legal discourse and practice and outline the main contours of the legal conception 
of global obligations. 
The major conclusions of this Article are as follows. The idea of human-
centricity, which sees a person as the ultimate unit of both moral and legal 
concern, is embedded in the International Bill of Human Rights and serves as a 
justifying basis for global obligations. Global obligations are morally justified 
human rights obligations. They should receive legal recognition, regulation, and 
implementation within the global polycentric community of multiple autonomous 
actors. This is a significant precondition for the shift from a state-centered to a 
human-centered global order, in which the state and global civil society should 
serve as two important “channels” for representing the interests and protecting 
human rights of individuals in the global domain. Two important steps for this 
shift are: (1) the recognition of individuals as independent subjects of 
extraterritorial legal relations capable of demanding the realization of their human 
rights directly from global actors and holding the latter accountable; and (2) the 
allocation of extraterritorial obligations, including global obligations, to all 
members of the international community—states, IGOs, NSAs, and 
individuals— which should be acknowledged as primary agents of global justice 
and as duty-bearers of extraterritorial obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill 
socio-economic rights. Additionally, global obligations are simultaneous, which 
means that they should be implemented in parallel to territorial human rights 
obligations. In their interactional and institutional aspects, global obligations 
comprehend both duties of result (to realize socio-economic rights necessary for 
the enjoyment of a decent standard of living worldwide and to create a just global 
institutional structure indispensable for their realization), and duties of conduct 
(to cooperate and to assist in the implementation of socio-economic rights). 
Finally, global human rights obligations are aimed at ensuring certain minimum 
guarantees in domains of relational and distributive justice that are essential for 
the enjoyment of basic equality. Relational justice guarantees should ensure 
individuals’ full-fledged participation in all key global institutions and practices, 
including important decision-making processes, while a global distributive scheme 
should embody a decent social minimum universally. 
